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Summons Issued (3) 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Plaintiff: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation Notice Of Appearance Jeffrey D. 
Brunson 
Judge 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Filing: A- Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Joel E. Tingey 
Paid by: Brunson, Jeffrey D. (attorney for April 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation) Receipt 
number: 0020910 Dated: 5/8/2009 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: April Beguesse, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation (plaintiff) 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Joel E. Tingey 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: David E. 
Alexander Receipt number: 0043413 Dated: 
9/21/2009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation 
(defendant), Rammell, Kenneth (defendant) and 
The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell 
(defendant) 
Answer, Counterclaim, and Demand for Jury Trial Joel E. Tingey 
(David E. Alexander for Kenneth Rammel!, 
Christa Beguesse, Inc & Estate of Christa 
Beguesse Rammell) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of April 
Beguesse, Inc 
Notice Of Service of Defendants First Set of 
Production of Documents 
Defendant: Rammell, Kenneth Notice Of 
Appearance David E Alexander 
Defendant: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation Notice Of Appearance David E 
Alexander 
Defendant: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse 
Rammell Notice Of Appearance David E 
Alexander 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 1st Set of 
Discovery Requests to Defendants) (fax) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant, Christa Bequesse, Joel E. Tingey 
Inc.'s Counterclaim (fax) 
Notice Of Service (P's Response to Defendants' Joel E. Tingey 
First Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents) 
Notice Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of April Joel E. Tingey 
Beguesse, Inc. 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of april Joel E. Tingey 
Beguesse, Inc. 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Kenneth Joel E. Tingey 
Rammel! **fax** 
001 
Date: 12/28/2012 Judicial District Court - Bonneville User: LMESSICK 
Time: 02:05 PM ROAReport 
Page 2 of 18 Case: CV-2009-0002767 Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, etal. 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The 
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel! 
Date Code User 
~·. ~;2009 STIP LYKE Stipulation for Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
:2/8/2009 ORDR SOUTHWIC Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
12/11/2009 NTOS LYKE Notice Of Service Plaintiffs First Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' First Set of Requests 
for Production of Documents 
1/11/2010 MOTN LYKE Motion for Leave to File Amended Counterclaim Joel E. Tingey 
1/12/2010 MOTN WOOLF Objection to Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Joel E. Tingey 
Amended Counterclaim 
1/25/2010 NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Leave to File Joel E. Tingey 
Amended Counterclaim (02/09/10@9:00AM) 
2/8/2010 STIP WOOLF Stipulation to Amend Pleadings Joel E. Tingey 
MOTN WOOLF Motion to Amend Complaint Joel E. Tingey 
2/10/2010 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order to amend pleadings Joel E. Tingey 
2!18/20 10 COMP WOOLF First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Joel E. Tingey 
10 NTOS WOOLF Notice Of Service (P's Response to Defendants' Joel E. Tingey 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions and Second Set of Requests for 
Production 
3/11/2010 ANSW DOOLITTL Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Joel E. Tingey 
Counterclaim, and Demand for Jury Trial 
MOTN DOOLITTL Motion to Shorten Time Joel E. Tingey 
3/16/2010 NTOS LYKE Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Second Set of Joel E. Tingey 
Discovery Requests to Defendant 
3/29/2010 MISC KESTER Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Amended Joel E. Tingey 
Counterclaim 
3/30/2010 NORT DOOLITTL Note Of Issue/request For Trial Joel E. Tingey 
3/31/2010 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order for telephonic status conference Joel E. Tingey 
4/22/2010 HRHD SOUTHWIC Hearing Held -- in chambers off record Joel E Tingey 
ORPT SOUTHWIC Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial Joel E. Tingey 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/25/2011 10:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) trial may go into a second week -- 2/02/2011 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Joel E. Tingey 
01/11/2011 08:30AM) 
5/24/2010 MOTN QUINTANA Motion for Leave to File First Amended Answer Joel E. Tingey 
NOTC QUINTANA Notice Regarding Requests for Admissions Joel E. Tingey 
Deemed Admitted 
QUINTANA Plaintiffs Second Set of Discovery Requests to Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants 
NTOS QUINTANA Notice Of Service Plaintiffs Second Set of Joel E Tingey 
Discovery Requests to Defendants 
5/28/2010 NTOS TBROWN Notice Of Service of Defs responses to pi's Joel E. Tingey 
second set of requests for admissions and 002 resposnes to plaintiffs second set of discovery 
Date: 12/28/2012 
Time: 02:05 PM 
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Notice Of Service of Defendant's 2nd Set of 
Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff 
Judge 
Joel E. Tingey 
Notice of Telephone Deposition Duces Tecum of Joel E. Tingey 
Linda Diamond Raznick 
Stipulation For Amended Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's Response to Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' 2nd Set of Request for Admissions to 
Plainff) (fax) 
AMENDED Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service of Defendants' 3rd Set of Joel E. Tingey 
Requests for Production of Documents and 
Defendants' 2nd Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
Notice Of Service Of Defendants' Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Responses To Plaintiff's Requests For Production 
Of Documents and Interrogatories - 07/26/2010 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents and Plaintiff's 1st 
Supplemental Response to Defendants' 1st Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd 
Set of Reequests for Production) (fax) 
Notice Of Service of Defendants' Fourth Set of Joel E. Tingey 
Requests for Production to Plaintiff 
Notice Of Service - Plaintiff's Response to Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Third Set of Requests for Production 
and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second 
Set of Interrogatories 
Notice Of Service - Plaintiff's Response to Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Fourth Set of Requests for 
Production 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/08/2010 09:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Alexander's motion for SJ 
Notice Of Service of Memorandum of Law, Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavits and Exhibits Submitted in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Under Seal Pursuant to Protective Order 
Document sealed 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing re: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (10/08/10@9:00AM) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service of Indexed Copies of Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Brief and Statement of Facts, Filed 
Under Seal 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Pete Masterson Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 003 
Date: 12/28/2012 
Time: 02:05 PM 
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Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Motion Joel E. Tingey 
For Summary Judgment -IN BLACK BINDER 
Document sealed 
Affidavit Of Counsel- IN BLACK BINDER Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 
Affidavit April Beguesse- IN BLACK BINDER Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 
Affidavit Of Don Mazzella -IN BLACK BINDER Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 
Second Affidavit Of Linda Diamond Raznick- IN Joel E. Tingey 
BLACK BINDER 
Document sealed 
Statement of Disputed Facts IN BLACK BINDER Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 
Motion To Strike -IN BLACK BINDER Joel E. Tingey 
Document sealed 
Plaintiffis Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Joel E. Tingey 
Strike- IN BLACK BINDER 
Document sealed 
Notice Of Hearing 10/08/2010 @9:00am RE: Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Motion To Strike- IN BLACK BINDER 
Document sealed 
Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs First Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response To Defendants' Second Set of 
Interrogatories, Plaintiffs Second Supplemental 
Response To Defendants' First Set Of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions And 
Second Set Of Requests For Production, and 
Plaintiffs Third Supplemental Response To 
Defendants' First Set Of Requests for Production 
Documents 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 1st Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' 3rd Set of Requests for 
Production upon the Defendants) 
Notice Of Filing Of Reply Brief Under Seal 
Notice Of Hearing 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits Joel E. Tingey 
of April Beguesse and Don Mazzella and Second 
Affidavit of Linda Diamond-Raznick 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Document sealed 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/08/2010 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Alexander's motion for SJ -- under 
100 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
004 
Date: 12/28/2012 
Time: 02:05 PM 
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Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 10/8/2010 
Time: 10:19 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 3rd Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd 
Set of Requests for Production) (fax) 
Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure (fax) Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum Decision and ORDER Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service of Defendants' Third Set of Joel E. Tingey 
Interrogatories and Fifth Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 4th Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of 
lnterrogatorise, Requests for Admissions and 2nd 
Set of Request for production upon the 
Defendants) (fax) 
Notice Of Service of Supplemental Responses to Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery to Defendants 
Notice Of Service (P's Resp to Defs 3rd Set of Joel E. Tingey 
lnterrogs & 5th Set of Requests) 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Memoramdum in Support of Plaintiffs Joel E. Tingey 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Plaintiff's Motion In Limine Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Joel E. Tingey 
Motion In Limine 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion In Limine Joel E. Tingey 
(01/11/2011 8:30AM) 
Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Motion To Joel E. Tingey 
Reconsider 
Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition Joel E. Tingey 
to Motion in Limine 005 
Date 12/28/2012 
';fle 02 05 PM 
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District Court Hearing Held Joel E. Tingey 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/6/2011 
Time: 11:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Plaintiffs Witness List 
Plaintiffs Exhibit List 
Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form 
Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions 
Plaintiffs Motion For Sanctions Or, In The 
Alternative, For A Limited Continuance 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Joel E. Tingey 
Sanctions Or, In The Alernative, For A Limited 
Continuance 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion For Joel E. Tingey 
Sanctions Or, In The Alternative, For A Limited 
Continuance (01/11/2011 8:30AM) 
Motion To Shorten Time Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavit Of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and 
Special Verdict Form 
Defendants' Exhibit List 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant's Witness List Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Joel E. Tingey 
01/11/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing Helt 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
OOG 
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Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 1/11/2011 
Time: 11:04 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/25/2011 
10:00 AM: Continued trial may go into a second 
week-- 2/02/2011 
Order for telephonic status conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
02/09/2011 08:45 AM) 
Defendant's Brief Filed in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions or Continunance 
Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony By April 
Beguesse As To Value Of Business 
Memorandum Of law In Support Of Defendants' 
Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony By April 
Beguesse As To Value Of Business 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Notice Of Hearing 02/10/2011 @9:00AM RE: 
Defendants' Motion In Limine To Exclude 
Testimony By April Beguesse As To The Value Of 
Business 
Judge 
Joel E Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 5th Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendants' 1st Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 2nd 
Set of Requests for Production) 
Order Re: January 6, 2011 Hearing 
Order Regarding January 11, 2011 Hearing 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion in 
Limine 
Affidavit of Counsel 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Objection to Plaintiffs Subpoena of Janel! Racine Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
02/09/2011 08:45AM: Hearing Held in 
chambers off the record 
Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
007 
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April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The 
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel! 
Date Code User 
2/9/2011 HRSC SOUTHWIC 
HRSC SOUTHWIC 
2/10/2011 MINE QUINTANA 
DENY QUINTANA 
3/2/2011 ASRV DOOLITTL 






• :Jt2011 SOUTHWIC 
SBARRERA 
3/22/2011 DCHH SOUTHWIC 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/27/2011 10:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) 5-6 days 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
09/13/2011 08:30AM) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Defendant's Motion in Limine 
Hearing date: 2/10/2011 
Time: 9:04 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Rhonda Quintana 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Motion Denied 
Amended Affidavit of Service- 2-10-11 
Stephen E. Martin Subpoena 
Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Notice Of Hearing 03/22/2011 @9:00AM RE: 
Plaintiffs Motion To consolidate 
Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Notice Of Hearing 03/22/2011 @9:00AM RE: 
Plaintiffs Motion To Consolidate 
Objection to motion to consolidate 
Objection To Motion To Consolidate 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
008 
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Date Code User 
3/22/2011 MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 3/22/2011 
Time: 10:20 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
3/23/2011 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order on Motion to Consolidate (motion to Joel E. Tingey 
consolidate denied) 
4/1/2011 NTOS LYKE Notice Of Service- Plaintiffs Sixth Supplemental Joel E. Tingey 
Response to Defendant 
4/7/2011 MOTN LYKE Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend to Add Joel E. Tingey 
Claim for Punitive Damages 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of John M. Avondet Joel E. Tingey 
MEMO LYKE Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Joel E. Tingey 
Leave to Amend to Add Claim for Punitive 
Damages 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Leave Joel E. Tingey 
to Amend to Add Claim (04/21/11 @9:00AM) 
4/12/2011 HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/21/2011 09:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Brunson - mo punitive damages 
4/15/2011 DOOLITTL Objection to motion for Leave to Add Claim for Joel E. Tingey 
Punitive Damages) 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
4/21/2011 DCHH SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Motion held on 04/21/2011 Joel E. Tingey 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Brunson - mo punitive damages --
under100 
009 
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Date Code User Judge 
4/21/2011 MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/21/2011 
Time: 10:57 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
4/22/2011 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order on motion to amend Joel E. Tingey 
5/10/2011 AMCO LYKE Second Amended Complaint Filed and Jury Joel E. Tingey 
Demand 
,cU i i DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Notice of Joel E. Tingey 
Deposition Duces Tecum of April Beguesse 
(fax) 
8/11/2011 NTOS LYKE Notice Of Service - Supplemental Responses to Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery to Defendants 
8/30/2011 MOTN LYKE Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Bruce Joel E. Tingey 
Denney and Tax Information of Abi and April 
Beguesse 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson Joel E. Tingey 
MEMO LYKE Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of ABI's Joel E. Tingey 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Bruce 
Denney and Tax Information of Abi and April 
Beguesse 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion in Limine Joel E. Tingey 
(9/13/11 @8:30AM) 
c;i?/2011 NOTC SBARRERA Notice Of Deposition Of Kent Oseen Joel E. Tingey 
11 MOTN LYKE Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Protective Order Joel E. Tingey 
(9/13/11 @8:30AM) 
MOTN LYKE Plaintifs Motion to Shorten Time Joel E. Tingey 
)/7/2011 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order Shortening Time Joel E. Tingey 
SBARRERA Defendant's Brief In Opposition To Plaintiffs Joel E. Tingey 
Motions In Limine 
1/8/2011 DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Witness List Joel E. Tingey 
DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Exhibit List Joel E. Tingey 010 
DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instruction Joel E. Tingey 
/9/2011 RTOS LYKE Return Of Service - 9/06/11 (Kent Oseen - Joel E. Tingey 
Subpoena) 
Date: 12/28/2012 Judicial District Court - Bonneville Co User: LMESSICK 
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Date Code User Judge 
9/12/2011 LYKE Defendants' Witness List Joel E. Tingey 
LYKE Defendants' Exhibit List Joel E. Tingey 
LYKE Defendants' Proposed Special Verdict Form Joel E. Tingey 
LYKE Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and Joel E. Tingey 
Special Verdict Form 
9/13/2011 DCHH SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey 
on 09/13/2011 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: + PI's mo for protective order under 
100 
9/14/2011 CONT SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
09/27/2011 10:00 AM: Continued 5-6 days 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order on Motion in Limine, Vacating Trial Joel E. Tingey 
9/20/2011 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order for status conference - 10/07/11 @ 8:45 Joel E. Tingey 
a.m. 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Joel E. Tingey 
10/07/2011 08:45AM) 
10/7/2011 HRHD SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey 
on 10/07/2011 08:45AM: Hearing Held in 
chambers off record 
ORPT SOUTHWIC Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial Joel E. Tingey 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/10/2012 10:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) 4-5 days 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Joel E. Tingey 
03/20/2012 08:45AM) 
2/16/2012 NTOS BOULWARE Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Seventh Joel E. Tingey 
Supplemental Response to Defendant's First Set 
of Interrogatories. 
3/2/2012 HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2012 10:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Brunson- mo limine 1/2 hr 
l/6/2012 MOTN DOOLITTL Plaintiffs 2nd Motion in Limine to Exclude Joel E. Tingey 
Testimony of Bruce Denney 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson Joel E. Tingey 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of David Smith Joel E. Tingey 
NOTH DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 4-6-12@ 10:00 Joel E. Tingey 
a.m. (Plaintiffs 2nd Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Testimony of Bruce Denney) 
/15/2012 DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Exhibit List Joel E. Tingey 
DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Witness List Joel E. Tingey 
119/2012 DOOLITTL Defendant's Exhibit List Joel E. Tingey 011 
DOOLITTL Defendant's Witness List Joel E. Tingey 
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Response To Plaintiff's Motion In Limine To 
Exclude Testimony Of Bruce Denny 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled 
on 03/20/2012 08:45AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
Request for Jury 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 3/20/2012 
Time: 11:26 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendants' Motion To 
Withdraw DEemed Admissions April6, 2012@ 
10:00 AM 
P- Renewed Motion in Limine to Limit the Tax 
Information of ABI and April Beguesse 
Notice of Hearing Re: Renewed Motion 
(04/06/12@1 O:OOAM) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant's Brief Filed in Opposition to Plaintiff's Joel E. Tingey 
Renewed Motion In Limine to Limit the tax 
Information of ABI and April Beguesse 
Affidavit of Service- 3-26-12 Crandall and Joel E. Tingey 
Oseen, PA 
Plaintiff's Affidavit of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Motion to Joel E. Tingey 
Withdraw Deemed Admissions 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Joel E. Tingey 
Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
ABI's Reply Brief In Support OF ABI's Second Joel E. Tingey 
Motion In Limine To Exclude Testimony Of Bruce 
Denney 
Defendant's 2nd Affidavit of Counsel in Joel E. Tingey 
Opposition to Motions In Limine (fax) 
012 
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Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
04/06/2012 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing He I< 
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Brunson- mo limine 1/2 hr --under 
100 
Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/6/2012 
Time: 11:17 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Jack Fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
Joel E. Tingey 
Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/9/2012 
Time: 4:19 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
(Fax) Defendant- Motion To Quash Subpoena To Joel E. Tingey 
Janell Racine 
Affidavit Of Gary L Cooper Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Videotaped Deposition Of Janell Racine Joel E. Tingey 
(Fax) 
Answer To Second Amended Complaint-
Kenneth Rammell 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
04/10/2012 10:00 AM: Trial Started 4-5 days 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
013 
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Notice Vacating Videotaped Deposition Of Janel! 
Racine (fax) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Jury Trial 
Hearing date: 4/17/2012 
Time: 9:54 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammell, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammell, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
Verdict Form 
Case Status Changed: Closed 
Civil Disposition entered for: Christa Beguesse, 
Inc., and Idaho Corporation, Defendant; Rammel!, 
Kenneth, Defendant; The Estate Of Christa 
Beguesse Rammel!, Defendant; April Beguesse, 
Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
4/17/2012 
Judgment Upon Verdict- PI have jdmt against 
defs jt & several of $354,000.00, PI have jdmt 
against Def Christa Beguesse Inc. for 
$190,013.00 
Judge 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/01/2012 09:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Brunson - mo att fees/costs 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiff-Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Joel E. Tingey 
Costs 
Memorandum Of Law RE: Award Of Attorney's Joel E. Tingey 
Fees 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion For Joel E. Tingey 
Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs 6-1-12@ 
9:00AM 
ABI's Memorandum Of Attorney Fees And Costs Joel E. Tingey 
And Affidavit Of Counsel 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Joel E. Tingey 
the Verdict or in the Alternative for New Trial 
Defendant's Affidavit of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion Joel E. Tingey 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in 
the Alternative for New Trial 
014 
2/28/2012 
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Date Code User Judge 
5/1/2012 AFFD SBARRERA Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
5/2/2012 TRAN SOUTHWIC Transcript Filed-- excerpt from Jury trial 4/13/12 Joel E. Tingey 
before Judge Joel Tingey 
5/4/2012 NOTH HUMPHREY Notice Of Hearing June 1, 2012 @9:00am Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict 
. 0/2012 MOTN SBARRERA Motion To Disallow Claimed Costs and Attorneys' Joel E. Tingey 
Fees 
5/9/2012 MOTN HUMPHREY Motion To Disallow Claimed Costs And Attorneys' Joel E. Tingey 
Fees 
5/25/2012 MEMO SOLIS Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants' Motion For JNOV Or New Trial 
5/31/2012 CONT SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
06/01/2012 09:00AM: Continued Brunson - mo 
att fees/costs 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/05/2012 10:30 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Brunson - Mo Att fees/Costs 
Alexander- Mo JNOV 
SOUTHWIC Notice of Hearing Joel E. Tingey 
6/1/2012 MEMO SOUTHWIC PI's Memorandum in Opposition to Defs' Motion Joel E. Tingey 
for JNOV or New Trial 
12 DCHH SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
06/05/2012 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Brunson Mo Att fees/Costs 
Alexander- Mo JNOV --under 100 
MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 6/5/2012 
Time: 1:55 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
3/12/2012 ORDR SOUTHWIC Supplemental Order On Motion For New Trial Joel E. Tingey 
SBARRERA Plaintiffs Acceptance Of Court's Remittitur Joel E. Tingey 
)/19/20 12 ORDR SOUTHWIC Order on Motion For costs and Attorney Fees (PI Joel E. Tingey 
is awarded $2409.29 in costs & $85,000.00 in att 
fees against Kenneth Rammel! and CBI) 
0 l~S 
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AMENDED Judgment (PI have jdmt against Defs Joel E. Tingey 
Kenneth Rammel! & Christa Beguesse, Inc, jt and 
several, in the amt of $354,000.00 PI also have 
jdmt against Def Christa Beguesse, Inc in the 
additional amt of $99,900 for a total of $453,900. 
PI also have jdmt against Defs K Rammel! & CBI 
for costs in the amt of $2409.29 & att fees in the 
amt of $85,000. Resulting in a total jdmt of 
$541,309.29 as to CBI and $441,409.29 as to 
Kenneth Rammell + int). PI's claim against the 
Estate of Christa Beguesse is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Case Status Changed: Closed Joel E. Tingey 
Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Joel E. Tingey 
Supreme Court Paid by: Racine Olson Receipt 
number: 0035844 Dated: 7/24/2012 Amount: 
$109.00 (Check) For: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and 
Idaho Corporation (defendant) and Rammel!, 
Kenneth (defendant) 
Notice Of Appeal (Kenneth Rammel!, Crista 
Beguesse) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Bond Posted Cash (Receipt 36676 Dated 
7/30/2012 for 100.00) 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Affidavit Of Interest 
Motion For Garnishment 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Writ Issued (Estate) $447,752.75 Bonneville Joel E. Tingey 
Writ Issued (Bank) $447,752.75 Bonneville Joel E. Tingey 
Writ Issued (Jeep) $447,752.75 Bonneville Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey 
by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney Receipt number: 
0038263 Dated: 8/7/2012 Amount: $6.00 
(Check) 
Writ Returned (Jeep) 
Writ Issued (Jeep) $447,752.75 Bonneville 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid 
by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney Receipt number: 
0038789 Dated: 8/10/2012 Amount: $2.00 
(Check) 
(SC) ORder Re: Amended Notice of Appeal 
Affidavit Of Interest 
Writ Issued $549,660.73 Bonneville 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
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Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey 
by: Beard St Clair Receipt number: 0040006 
Dated: 8/17/2012 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Writ returned, Unsatisfied (Bank) Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/05/2012 08:30 Joel E Tingey 
AM) Brunson -- ABI's objection to Rammell's 
claim of exemption 
Case Status Changed: Reopened Joel E. Tingey 
Appellants' Amended Notice of Appeal Joel E. Tingey 
Writ returned, Unsatisfied Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption Joel E. Tingey 
and for Injunctive Relief 
Affidavit of Counsel (Plaintiff) 
Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing 9-18-12 @ 11:00 
a.m. {Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption 
and for Injunctive Relief} 
(SC) Amended Notice of Appeal Filed - Record 
due 12/5/12 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E Tingey 
Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel Joel E Tingey 
Amended Notice Of Hearing - 10/05/2012 @ Joel E. Tingey 
9:00AM RE: Motion To Contest Claim Of 
Exemption And For Injunctive Relief (Fax) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
09/18/2012 11:00 AM: Continued Brunson --
ABI's objection to Rammell's claim of exemption 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/05/2012 09:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Brunson - ABI's objection to Rammell's 
claim of exemption 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
10/05/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Held Brunson-
ABI's objection to Rammell's claim of exemption 
Order Joel E Tingey 
Affidavit Of Interest Joel E. Tingey 
Writ Of Execution Issued $452,740.99 
Bannock 
Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey 
by: Beard St Clair Gaffney Receipt number: 
0051625 Dated: 10/24/2012 Amount: $2.00 
(Check) 
Defendant- Ex Parte Motion To Shorten Time Joel E. Tingey 
Motion To Amend Order 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Amend And 
Motion To shorten Time 11-13-12 @ 4:00 
PM 
Joel E Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 017 
12/28/2012 
T;me: 02:05PM 
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Case: CV-2009-0002767 Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, eta!. 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation vs. Kenneth Rammel!, Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho Corporation, The 
Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel! 
Date Code User Judge 
11/13/2012 DCHH SOUTHWIC District Court Hearing Held Joel E. Tingey 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
SOUTHWIC Objection to Motion to Amend Order and Request Joel E. Tingey 
to appear Telephonically 
AFFD SOUTHWIC Affidavit of Counsel Joel E. Tingey 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Amended Order Joel E. Tingey 
DOOLITTL Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Amend Order Joel E. Tingey 
and Request to Appear Telephonic (fax) 
AFFD DOOLITTL Plaintiff's Affidavit of Counsel (fax) Joel E. Tingey 
11/14/2012 MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/14/2012 
Time: 7:54 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 
Party: April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Attorney: Jeffrey Brunson 
Party: Christa Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: David Alexander 
Party: Kenneth Rammel!, Attorney: David 
Alexander 
Party: The Estate Of Christa Beguesse Rammel!, 
Attorney: David Alexander 
11/16/2012 WRTU DOOLITTL Writ returned, Unsatisfied Joel E. Tingey 
12/26/2012 WRTU DOOLITTL Writ returned, Unsatisfied Joel E. Tingey 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
- • ~ !f .-;. o~ r 
U U·, 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
CASE ASSIGNED TO 
HON. JOEL E. TINGEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CV-09- ?r:t04-
VS. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa Complaint and Jury Demand 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammel!, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc., through its attorneys, alleges and complains 
against the Defendants as follows. 
PARTIES 
1. April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
2. Kenneth Rammell (Rammell) is an individual residing in Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 01 q 
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3. Christ Beguesse, Inc. (CBI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
4. The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its personal representative, 
Kenneth Rammell, filed an application for informal probate in B01meville County, Idaho 
on March 11, 2009, Case No. CV-09-1682. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-
514. 
6. Bonneville County is the proper venue for this action under Idaho Code § 5-
404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. In November 2001, April Beguesse (April) was contacted by her mother, 
Christa Beguesse (Christa), regarding the possibility of April taking over Christa's 
business, CBI. April traveled to Idaho Falls to discuss the possibility with Christa and 
Rammell. 
8. CBI was in the type setting business. 
9. Rammell and Christa were both officers and directors in CBI. 
10. Rammell and Christa told April that she could purchase and take over the 
business. 
11. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed self-
sustaining contract with a customer. 
12. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
proprietary books valued at over $1,000,000. 
13. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary 0 2 0 
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software program unique to CBI's business. 
14. Rammell and Christa represented that CBI owned intellectual property. 
15. Rammell and Christa indicated that they would sell the business for $12,000 a 
month for eight years. 
16. Rammell stated that they were being very generous and that April would be a 
fool not to accept the offer. 
17. On January 2002, April left a promising career in Boston, Massachusetts to 
work for CBI. 
18. Initially, April worked for CBI as an employee. 
19. In November 2003, April formed ABI. 
20. Both Rammell and Christa indicated on many occasions that the assets of CBI 
would be left to April when Christa died. 
21. In February 2004, ABI commenced making monthly payments to CBI for 
$12,000 month. 
22. ABI took ownership of all past and current debts of CBI and started operating 
the business. ABI paid all the bills including the monthly rent to a third party. 
23. ABI purchased all new computers, printers, scanners, phone system, updated 
programs and hardware and updated the office furniture. 
24. Ranunell indicated that he had a contract that his brother had used for his 
business that Rammell had altered. 
25. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case of 
Christa's death payments would continue. 
26. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. Q 21 
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27. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease after 
Christa's death. 
28. Rammell and Christa repeatedly made the representations alleged in the 
previous paragraphs. 
29. Based on the representations of Rammell and Christa, April ultimately signed 
a document entitled "lease agreement". The purported agreement is between CBI and 
ABI and made effective January 1, 2004. 
30. The purported agreement provides: 
BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises 
set forth in this Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease, 
Lessor leases, demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases, 
demises and rents from Lessor, that certain business described in Exhibit 
'A' attached hereto (the 'Business"), that certain equipment described in 
Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. (Such business and equipment identified in 
Exhibits 'A' and 'B', shall collectively be referred to herein as 'the 
Property', unless otherwise indicated. 
31. Exhibits A and B attached to the purported agreement were completely blank. 
32. ABI continued making monthly payments to CBI in an amount of $12,000 
until November 1, 2008. 
33. ABI also paid Christa for consulting and professional services. 
34. On November 10, 2008, Christa died. 
35. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April. 
36. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of Christa's 
possessions go to Rammel!. 
37. After visiting an attorney after her mother's death, April learned for the first 
time that the representations made by Rammell and Christa alleged in the previous 
paragraphs were false. 
38. There was no guaranteed contract with a major customer. Rather, the 
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customer could leave at any time. 
39. The library referenced by Rammell and Christa is actually owned by the 
customer. 
40. The referenced proprietary software program was a software program that 
could be purchased offthe shelf. 
41. On March 1, 2009, April moved to Nevada. 
42. On March 11, 2009, Rammell applied for informal probate for Christa's estate 
in Bonneville County, Idaho, Case No. CV-09-1682. 
43. On April13, 2009, Christa's estate on behalf of CBI filed a complaint against 
ABI and April individually in Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A587645. The Nevada 
complaint seeks to enforce the purported agreement. 
44. A motion to dismiss the Nevada case is being filed on the basis of forum non 
convemens. 
COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
45. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
46. Critical portions to the purported lease contract between ABI and CBI were 
left blank. 
47. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because there was never mutual 
assent. 
48. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because the purported agreement is 
missing essential terms. 
49. ABI and CBI never contemplated a lease of the business but rather 
contemplated a purchase of certain CBI assets. 
50. This Court has the power to declare that there is no lease contract between 
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ABI and CBI pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201. 
51. ABI is an interested person as defined by Idaho Code § 10-1202. 
52. This Court should declare that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI. 
53. Alternatively, the lease contract should be reformed to meet the intent of 
parties. 
54. To the extent the Comi finds an enforceable contract, the contract should be 
rescinded due to the defendants' fraudulent conduct and all monies paid should be 
refunded. 
55. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attomey fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT TWO: FRAUD 
56. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
57. The defendants acting individually and on behalf of CBI made numerous 
representations to ABI and April including but not limited to the following: 
a. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed self-
sustaining contract with a major customer. 
b. Rammell and Clu·ista represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
proprietary books valued at over $1,000,000. 
c. Ranunell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary 
software program unique to CBI's business. 0 2 4 
Complaint and Jury Demand Page 6 
d. Rammell and Christa represented that there was intellectual property 
unique to CBI. 
e. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
f. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
afier Christa's death. 
58. The defendants failed to disclose that: 
a. There was no guaranteed contract and that the major customer could leave 
at any time for any reason. 
b. The library of proprietary books was in fact owned by the major customer 
and not CBI. 
c. That the software program utilized by CBI could be purchased off the 
shelf. 
d. That CBI did not own any intellectual property. 
59. The statements and omissions of the defendants were false. 
60. The statements and omissions of the defendants were material. 
61. The defendants knew the statements and omissions were false. 
62. The defendants intended that ABI rely on the false statements and omissions. 
63. ABI and April did not know the statements and omissions were false. 
64. ABI relied on the statements and omissions by signing the purported 
agreement and by paying $12,000 a month to CBI from February 2004 to November 
2008. 
65. Such reliance by ABI was justifiable. 
66. As a result of the defendants' false statements and omissions, ABI has been 
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damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
67. The defendants' conduct constitutes affinnative fraud, fraud by omission, and 
fraud in the inducement. 
68. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT THREE: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
69. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
70. The defendants and ABI had a relationship of trust and confidence because 
ChTista, Rammell, and April were members of the same family and CBI and ABI were in 
contractual negotiations and ultimately signed an agreement. 
71. The defendants breached this relationship of trust and confidence. 
72. ABI is not required to establish that the defendants' knew their statement and 
omissions were false or that the defendants intended ABI rely on their false statements 
and omissions. 
73. The defendants conduct constitutes constructive fraud. 
74. As a result of the defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
75. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT FOUR: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
76. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
77. The defendants promised to sell or assign several assets of CBI to ABI in 
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exchange for payment of $12,000/month. 
78. These assets include but are not limited to: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
79. The parties' exchange of promises constitutes a binding contract. 
80. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract and is not in 
material breach. 
81. The defendants materially breached the contract by failing to provide the 
agreed upon assets. 
82. The defendants conduct constitutes a failure of consideration. 
83. The defendants conduct also constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
84. The defendants' material breaches are the direct and proximate cause of 
damages to ABI. 
85. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
86. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT FIVE: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 
87. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
88. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets. 
89. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract. 
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90. As part of the contract the defendants expressly represented and warranted 
that CBI could transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business; 
d. other intellectual prope1iy. 
91. This warranty was a material term of the contract and its breach constitutes a 
material breach of the contract. 
92. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-312, in every contract for sale there is a 
warranty of title that the title is good and its transfer is rightful. 
93. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 28-2-313,28-121-210, any affirmation of fact or 
promise made by the seller or lessor to the buyer or lessee, which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
94. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-313, any description of the goods which is 
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the description. 
95. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-12-211, there is a warranty that no other person 
holds a claim to or interest in the goods. 
96. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and the assets transferred, if 
any, did not conform. 
97. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to ABI. 
98. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 0 2 8 
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99. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 1 120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SIX: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
100. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
101. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets. 
102. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract. 
103. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that CBI could 
transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary books valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business; 
d. other intellectual prope1iy. 
104. This wananty was a material term of the contract and its breach 
constitutes a material breach of the contract. 
I 05. As part of the contract, the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets 
to be transferred would be merchantable, that is to say that it would pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; that it would be fit for the ordinary 
purpose of such goods; and that it would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact 
made. 
106. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets 
was fit for a particular purpose, that is to say that the defendants knew the purpose for 
which ABI intended it and that the ABI was relying upon the defendants to furnish the 
assets, and warranted thus impliedly warranted that the assets were suitable for that 
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purpose. 
107. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and such assets did not 
conform or were not suitable for ABI's purposes. 
108. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to 
ABI. 
1 09. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
110. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SEVEN: UNJUST ENIRCHMENT 
111. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
112. ABI provided a benefit to the defendants by paying $12,000 a month from 
February 2004 to November 2008. 
113. Because ABI did not get what was promised, it would be unjust for ABI to 
retain the benefit. 
114. As a result of defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
115. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
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COUNT EIGHT: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
116. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
117. The defendants took the position that April would no longer make any 
payments after Clu·ista' s death. 
118. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case 
of Christa's death payments would continue. 
119. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
120. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
after Christa's death. 
121. On November 10,2008, Christa died. 
122. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April or ABI. 
123. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of 
Christa's possessions go to Rammel!. 
124. ABI relied on the representations to its disadvantage. 
125. It would be unconscionable to allow the defendants to maintain the 
inconsistent position that payments were to continue after Christa's death. 
126. The defendants should be estopped from claiming that the payments must 
continue. 
127. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
Complaint and Jury Demand Page 13 
031 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. Judgment against the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. A declaration that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI. 
3. An order estopping the defendants from claiming payments should continue. 
4. An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to agreement Idaho Code§§ 12-
120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
5. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 
PURSUANT TO RULE 38 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY 
Dated: May 7, 2009. 
ns , ISB No. 6996 
ondet, ISB No. 7438 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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\V. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RA.CINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-61 09 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






AND DEMAND FOR JlJRY TRIAL 
vs. ) 
) 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 
personal representative, Kenneth ) 
Rammel!. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ____________________________ ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually and as personal 
representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, and CHRISTA 
BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, by and through their attorney of record, Marcus W. Nye 
of the finn of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and in response to the Complaint of 
the Plaintiff filed herein, admit, deny and allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these 
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Defendants, and should be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation ofthe Complaint not specifically admitted 
herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 9 of the Complaint. 
3. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 10 though 14 of the Complaint. 
4. In response to paragraph 15 ofthe Complaint, Defendants state that a contract was 
entered into between Christa Beguesse, Inc. and April Beguesse, Inc., the tem1s of which contract 
speak for themselves. 
5. Defendants are without sufficient infonnation to detem1ine the truth of the allegations 
of Paragraph 16 ofthe Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
6. Defendants are without sufficient information to fonn an opinion as to the truth of 
the allegations in paragraph 17, and therefore deny the same. 
7. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Complaint. 
8. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Complaint. 
9. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the 
allegations of paragraph 23 of the Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
11. Paragraph 24 of the Complaint fails to state facts with sufficient clarity to permit 
these defendants from forming an opinion as to their truth or falsity, and Defendants therefore deny 
the same. To the extent paragraph 24 makes any allegations regarding the contents of a contract, 
Defendants respond that said contract speaks for itself. 
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12. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and state further 
that the contract speaks for itself. 
13. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the Complaint. 
14. In response to paragraph 29, Defendants deny that April signed the contract "based 
on the representations of Rammell and Christa." Defendants admit that April signed a contract 
entitled "Lease Agreement" between CBI and ABI, effective January 1, 2004. 
1 5. In response to paragraphs 3 0 and 31 of the Complaint, Defendant states that the 
alleged contract speaks for itself. 
16. The Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 32 through 36. 
17. The Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 37. 
18. In response to paragraph 38 of the Complaint, to the extent that it alleges the 
existence of a contract between CBI and a customer, said contract speaks for itself. 
19. In response to paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants deny ever having made 
reference to a "library" owned by CBI, or any representations contrary to the facts. 
20. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 40 of the complaint. 
21. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 41 through 44 ofthe complaint. 
COUNT 1: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
22. In response to paragraph 45 of the complaint, the Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 44. 
Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 46 through 50. 
24. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 51 of the Complaint. 
25. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 52 to 55 of the Complaint. 
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COUNT2: FRAUD 
26. In response to paragraph 56 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 55. 
27. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 57 through 68. 
COUNT 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
28. In response to paragraph 69 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 68. 
29. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 70 through 7 5 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 4: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
30. In response to paragraph 76 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 
to paragraphs 1-7 5. 
31. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 77 and 78. 
32. In response to paragraph 79 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that the parties 
entered into a binding contract, pursuant to which the parties performed from January 2004 until 
November 2008, and that the terms of the contract speak for themselves. 
33. In response to paragraph 80 of the Complaint. Defendant admits that ABI 
substantially performed its obligations under the contract until November 2008, at which time it 
ceased performing under the contract, and is cuHently in material breach thereof. 
34. Defendants deny the allegations of 81 through 86 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 5: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 
35. In response to paragraph 87 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 1 
through 86. 
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36. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 88 of the Complaint. 
3 7. In response to paragraph 89, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is in material breach 
of its obligations under the contract. 
3 8. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 90 and 91. 
39. In response to paragraphs 92 through 95 of the Complaint, the Idaho Statutes 
referenced therein speak for themselves and are the best evidence of the statutory requirements. 
Said paragraphs do not otherwise appear to require a response from the Defendants. 
40. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 96 through 99. 
COUNT 6: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
41. In response to paragraph 1 00 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 99. 
42. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 101. 
43. In response to paragraph 102, Defendants admit that ABI sustantially performed 
its obligations under the contract through November 2008, but since that time is in material 
breach of the contract. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 103 through 110. 
COUNT 7: UNJUST El'i'RICHMENT 
45. In response to paragraph 111 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 
to paragraphs 1 through 110. 
46. In response to paragraph 112, Defendants admit that ABI paid Defendants 
$12,000.00 per month for February 2004 to November 2008. Defendants deny all other 
allegations ofparagraph 112. 
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47. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 113 through 115 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 8: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
48. In response to paragraph 116 ofthe Complaint, Defendant restates its responses to 
paragraphs 1 through 115. 
49. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 117 through 120 of the Complaint. 
50. Defendants admit the allegation of paragraphs 121 through 122 ofthe Complaint. 
51. In response to Paragraph 123 of the Complaint, Defendants aver that a 
holographic will was produced. 
52. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 124 through 127 of the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable statutes of frauds, including but 
not limited to Idaho Code§ 9-505, § 15-2-701, and§ 28-2-201. 
SECOND AFFIRl\1A TIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable of statutes of limitations, including 
but not limited to I.C. § 5-216, § 5-217, § 5-218, and§§ 15-3-801, et seq. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgement, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of contract, 
breach of express and implied vvarranties and unjust enrichment and quasi-estoppel are barred by 
the doctrine of laches. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
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Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its obligations and duties under the contract. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants expressly disclaimed in the contract all express and implied wananties. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims should be baned by Plaintiffs material breach of the contract at issue in 
this matter. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of Racine, Olson, 
Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and are entitled to a reasonable fee therefor pursuant to Idaho Code, 
including, but not limited to, I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and paragraph 17 of the Lease 
Agreement between the parties. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that judgment be entered in this action declaring the 
respective rights and duties of the parties, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice, 
awarding the Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and granting Defendants such 
other and further relief as is just under the circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, Defendant /Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho 
corporation, by and through counsel, and for its Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho corporation, as follows: 
PARTIES & JURISDICTION 
1. Defendant/Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (herein "CBI"), is a 
corporation in good standing registered under the laws of the State of Idaho, having its principal 
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place of business in Idaho Falls, Bo1meville County, Idaho. 
2. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant April Beguesse, Inc. (herein "ABI"), is a corporation 
in good standing registered under the laws of the State ofidaho, having its principal place of 
business in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. The actions, or failures to act, giving rise to this cause of action occurred or 
should have occurred in Bom1eville County, Idaho. 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court. 
BACKGROUND 
5. For several years, CBI operated a profitable business and acquired assets for the 
operation of the business. 
6. On or before January 1, 2004, CBI entered into an agreement with ABI, pursuant 
to which ABI agreed to lease the business and assets (collectively "the Assets") from CBI for a 
period of eight consecutive years commencing January 1, 2004. The Lease Agreement (herein 
"the Agreement") between CBI and ABI required ABI to make rent payments to CBI in the 
amount of $12,000 per month, beginning in January 2004 and continuing for ninety-six months, 
through December 31, 2011. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
7. The Agreement provided that the Assets leased to ABI were to be described in 
exhibits attached thereto. Even though the parties inadvertently failed to specifically describe the 
leased Assets in the exhibits, the parties performed their obligations under the Agreement for a 
period of almost 5 years, until November 2008. During the years of performance, ABI used 
CBI's Assets, and ABI also made the required lease payments to CBI, thereby establishing 
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through the parties' conduct and dealings the specific assets that were intended to be the subject 
of the Agreement. 
8. ABI has failed or refused to make the rent payments to CBI after November 2008, 
despite having been given notice of default. CBI never received payment from ABI for 
December 2008 or any month thereafter. 
9. Since November 2008, ABI has continued to use CBI's Assets to operate the 
business that was the subject of the Agreement. 
10. On information and belief, since it stopped making the rent payments to CBI, ABI 
has continued to make profits from the use of CBI' s Assets. 
COUNT I 
(Breach of Contract) 
11. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by 
reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
12. The above-described Agreement is a legal and binding contract properly formed 
between CBI and ABI. 
13. ABI's failure or refusal to make the rent payments as required by the Agreement is 
a material breach of the Agreement. 
14. CBI has suffered damages, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of ABI's 
breach, in the amount of $12,000 per month for unpaid rent, beginning with December 2008 and 
continuing until such time as the breach is cured or the lease expires, together with interest 
accruing on each payment from the due date at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. 
COUNT II 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
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15. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by 
reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
16. ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use CBI's Assets that were 
the subject of the lease Agreement even though it has failed to make the rent payments therefor. 
17. ABI continues to derive a valuable economic benefit from its wrongful use of the 
CBI's Assets that were the subject of the lease Agreement. 
18. CBI has conferred a benefit upon ABI, which benefit has been appreciated by 
ABI, and it would be inequitable for ABI to retain the benefit without payment for the value 
thereof to CBI. 
19. ABI has been unjustly enriched and is liable to CBI for the value of the benefit 
conferred, in an amount to be established at trial. 
COUNT III 
(Constructive Trust) 
20. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by 
reference and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
21. ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use the Assets that were the 
subject ofthe Agreement with CBI even though it has failed to make full payment to CBI for 
those Assets. 
22. ABI's continued use of the Assets without full payment to CBI is wrongful. 
23. ABI continues to derive an economic benefit from its wrongful use of the Assets 
that were the subject of the Agreement. 
24. CBI has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to a constructive trust in its 
favor for all profits earned by ABI derived from the Assets that were the subject of the 
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Agreement with CBI and for which ABI has not made full payment. 
A TTOR~EY FEES 
25. CBI has been required to retain the assistance of the law firm Racine, Olson, Nye, 
Budge & Bailey, Chartered, to pursue and protect its legal interests related to this matter and is 
entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code, including sections 12-
120(3) and 12-121, and pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Lease Agreement between the parties. 
WHEREFORE, CBI prays for judgment against Counterdefendant ABI as follows: 
A For a money judgment in the amount of$12,000 per month, beginning with 
December 2008 through such time as ABI cures its default or is no longer obligated to make 
payments under the Lease Agreement; or in the alternative, for the value of the benefit CBI has 
confeiTed upon ABI for which it is unjust for ABI to retain, in an amount to be established at 
trial; plus interest thereon from each payment due date at the rate of 8% per annum. 
B. For a constructive trust in favor of CBI for all profits earned by ABI from its use 
of the Assets it has used pursuant to the Lease Agreement with CBI since November 2008. 
C. For CBI's costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees inculTed in this action. In the 
event of default, a reasonably attorneys fee shall be $10,000. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant Kem1eth Rammel, individually and as personal representative of the estate of 
Christa Beguesse Rammel, and Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI hereby request a trial by jury on 
all issues so triable. 
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Dated this ( "b~ay of September, 2009. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE 
A1LEY, CHARTE D 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
<;~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thei_U_ day of September, 2009, I served a true, correct 
and copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
J!1 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
This Lease Agreement (subsequently called ''this Lease") is entered and made effective as 
the l't day of January, 2004, by and between, CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho cOiporation, 
(subsequently called "Lessor"), and APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, (subsequently 
called "Lessee"). This Lease is made upon the terms and conditions subsequently set forth in this 
document. In that regard, Lessor and Lessee each agree to observe and perform each and every term 
and condition of this Lease, as subsequently set forth in this document, as each such term or 
condition relates to each such party. 
1. BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises set forth 
in thls Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease, Lessor leases, 
demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases, demises and rents from Lessor, 
that certain business described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Business"), that 
certain equipment described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto. (Such business and 
equipment identified in Exhibits "A" and "B'', shall collectively be referred to herein 
as "the Property", unless otherwise indicated.) 
· 2. TERM. Lessee shall have and hold the Property, together with any other 
appurtenances, privileges, rights and easements belonging to the Property, or in any 
way appertaining to the Property, for a term of eight (8) consecutive years ------------·--
commencing on January I, 2004, and continuing until midnight on December 31, 
2011. 
3. POSSESSION. Lessee shall be entitled to possession of the Property on January 1, 
2004. Prior to taking possession of the Property, Lessee shall pay Lessor the first 
month's rental installment as subsequently identified and described below, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties herein. 
4. RENT. As rental for the Property, Lessee shall pay the following: 
A. BASE RENT. Lessee shall pay Lessor rent in the amount of Twelve 
Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) per month .. Each such monthly rental amount 
shall be payable in advance, beginning on the last day of January, 2004, and 
continuing on the last day of each successive month thereafter, for 96 months, 
until the expiration of the tenn of this Lease, on December 31, 20 I 1, all as 
adjusted from year to year as subsequently provided in this Lease. Lessor 
may assess a l~te fee on any payment made after the ]ast day of the month in 
which the payment is due. The amount of the late fee shall be equa] to 5% of 
the late payment. 
B. ADDITIONAL RENT. This Lease allocates a11 responsibility to Lessee for 
provision and payment of all "operating costs" as subsequently identified and 
described in this Lease. In that regard, if any such "operating costs" are paid 
or incurred by Lessor at a...v time during this Lease, Lessee shall pay or 
reimburse to Lessor as additionaLrent.all such "operating costs" so paid or 
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incurred by Lessor. Lessor shall give Lessee ten days notice of any 
unexpected "operating costs". 
1. "Operating Costs" Defined. For the purpose of this Lease, the tenn, 
"operating costs", shall include all costs of operation, management, 
and maintenance ofthe Property. The term, "operating costs", shall 
specifically include the following costs, by way of illustrations, but 
not by way of limitation, as they relate to the Property: 
a. licenses, documents, credit repor1s, permits, inspection fees, 
and financial statements; 
b. all taxes, (income, excise, property, withholdings and any 
other taxes that become due and owing as a result of the 
Property); · 
c. any costs or fees imposed upon the Property for any reason 
whatsoever; · 
d. in the event Lessee fails to repair and maintain the Property in 
a timely manner, as provided in this Agreement, and in the 
event Lessor hires personnel to repair or maintain the Property, 
Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for wages, salaries and 
· employees benefits of personnel engaged in operation and 
maintenance of the Property; 
e. supplies, materials, office equipment, property and tools; and 
f. any and all expenses related to the operation and management 
of the Business; 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, Lessee may replace 
any obsolete equipment, provided however that Lessee ls responsible 
for the payment of any and all costs arising out of said replacement. 
Said replaced equipment shall at all times be, and remain, the property 
of the Lessor. 
C. PLACE OF PAYMENT. Lessee specifically acknowledges that all rental 
payments due under this Lease, including any late fees, shall be made or 
delivered to Lessor at Lessors place ofbusiness or at such other place as 
Lessor may designate in writing from time to time. The failure of Lessee to 
pay the full amount of the· Base Rent and ali other rental payments, including 
without limitation any additional rent and adjusted rent as previously 
identified and described, each month as the same comes due shall constitute a 
material breach of this Lease and a default under this Lease. 
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5. COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS. The Property shall not be used for any unlawful 
purpose during the term of this Lease. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state, 
county and city ordinances, Laws and regulations, present or future, affecting the use 
of, or the type the Property. Likewise, compliance with any contracts affecting or 
relating to the Property. 
6. MAINTENANCE. Lessee shall at all times from and after delivery of possession of 
the Property to Lessee (at Lessee's own cost and expense) maintain, repair and/or 
replace (subsequently called "maintenance") in good and rentable condition the 
Property and every pari thereof. Such maintenance shall be performed by Lessee in a 
good and workmanlike manner. Lessee shall also perform such items of 
maintenance or improvement to the Property as may at any time be required by any 
government agency or private company having jurisdiction over the Property. 
7. NO OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY. Nothing in this Lease shall imply any duty 
on the part of the Lessor to do any maintenance or work under any provision of this 
Lease that the Lessee may be required to do, nor shall it constitute a waiver of 
. Lessee's breach or default in failing to do the same. No exercise by the Lessor of any 
rights in this Lease shall entitle Lessee to any damages for any injury or 
inconvenience occasioned thereby, not to any abatement of rent Once again, in the 
event that Lessor makes or causes any such repairs to be made or performed, as 
previously provided herein, Lessee shall pay the cost thereof to Lessor, forthwith, as 
additional rent upon receipt of a bill therefore. 
8. WASTE. Lessee shall not commit any waste or damage to the Property, nor permit 
any waste or damage to be done to the Property. 
9. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY. Except with respect to any maintenance 
obligations expressly assumed by Lessor in this Lease, Lessee shall maintain the 
Property in as good condition as the Property is when Lessee takes possession of the 
Property, reasonable wear and tear excepted. At the termination of this Lease in any 
manner, Lessee shall surrender the Property to Lessor in the condition described· 
above. 
I 0. INSURANCE. 
A LESSEE'S OBLIGATION. Lessee shall maintain, and pay for, adequate fire 
and extended coverage insurance upon the Property. Lessee shall maintain all 
such policies in force during the term of this Lease and shall provide Lessor 
with copies of ali certificates of insurance or other satisfacto.ry evidence of 
insurance at the beginning of the term prior to taking possession of the 
Property and at any other subsequent time requested by Lessor. 
B. WAIVER OF SUBROGATION. Lessee waives any and all rights of 
recovery against Lessor's managers, members, employees, agents, 
representatives and insurers for Ioss of damage to Lessee's property insured 
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under a standard fire insurance policy with all permissible extension 
endorsements covering additional perils or under any other policy or 
insurance carried by Lessee in lieu thereof. 
II. ACCEPTAl';fCE OF PROPERTY. Lessee has thoroughly inspected the Property 
prior to executing this Lease> and as a result of that inspection} Lessee accept the 
Property in their present condition and consider the same to be in a state of good 
repair. Nevertheless, Lessee shall pay for all cost increased caused by any such 
variations in the form of adjusted rents as previously identified and described in the 
Lease. 
12. NON-LIABILITY OF LESSOR. As part of the consideration for this Lease, 
Lessor shall not be Liable for any injury or damage which may be sustained by the 
person or property of Lessee, or any other persons .or property, resulting from the 
condition of the Property, or any part thereof, latent or otherwise. 
13. LESSOR'S DISCLAJMER. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS 
LEASE, LESSOR DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES RELATING TO 
THE PROPERTY, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
FI1NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF COMMERCIAL OR PROFESSIONAL HABIT ABILITY. BY SIGNING TIUS 
LEASE, LESSEE ACCEPTS THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LESSOR'S 
DISCLAIMER. 
t4. TIME OF ESSENCE. Time and strict and faithful performance of each and every 
one of the conditions ofthis Lease is expressly made the essence of this Lease. 
15. DEFAULT. Lessor shall have the following remedies: 
A Default in Rents or Other Provisions. If Lessee fails to pay off any part of the 
rents under this Lease when such rents are due, or if Lessee fails to keep, 
perform or observe any of the conditions or terms contained in this Lease, and 
such default in payment or performance remains for a period of thirty (30) 
days after written notice shaH have been sent by certified mail to Lessee, then 
and in such event, Lessor, at Lessor's election, may declare the term of this 
Lease ended and this Lease forfeited, and Lessor may enter Lessee's principal 
place of business to repossess and enjoy the Property. 
B. Additional Remedies. The remedies set forth in this Lease shall be 
. considered optional remedies and not a waiver of any right or remedy that 
Lessor would otherwise have at law or in equity to enforce the performance 
of this Lease or to recover damages for breach of any condition or term of this 
Lease or for default of any promise under this Lease. 
LEASE AGREEMENT 048 
C. Default Waiver. A waiver of any default or breach of any term ofthis Lease 
by Lessor shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other default or breach of 
the same term or of any other term of this Lease. All waivers must be in 
writing and be signed by Lessor. 
16. LESSOR'S RIGHT TO CURE LESSEE'S DEFAULTS. IfLesseeshaU breach 
any condition or term, or default in the performance of any promise, in this Lease 
required to be performed by Lessee, the Lessor may, after thirty (30) days written 
notice to Lessee, in which event Lessee shall reimburse Lessor for all sums paid to 
effect such cure, together with interest and a reasonable attorney's fees. In order to 
collect such reimbursement, Lessor shall have all the remedies available under this 
Lease for a default in the payment of rents, and the provisions of this paragraph shall 
survive the termination of this Lease. Nothing in this paragraph provided shall in any 
way require Lessor to perform any such condition or term or correct any such default 
on the part of Lessee. 
17. ATTORNEYS FEES. In the event suit is brought to enforce any of the terms and 
_conditions ofthis Lease, then the successful party to such suit shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees, together with such other legal costs as may be 
·authorized by law. 
18. INTEREST. Any right of Lessor to "interest" from Lessee as allowed or indicated 
in this Lease shall accrue at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, unless 
otherwise specificaiiy stated in the context of this Lease. 
19. NOTICES. All notices required to be given to Lessee under this Lease shall be 
given by depositing a copy of such notice in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Lessee at Lessee's principal 
place ofbusiness, or to such other address as the Lessee shall direct by a writing 
delivered to the Lessor. Such notice may be given by depositing a copy of such 
notice in the United States main, postage prepaid by regular mail at said address if 
Lessee refuses to sign the return receipt requested. 
20. MODIFICATION. This Lease contains 1the entire agreement between Lessor and 
Lessee and the provisions of this Lease may not be modified or changed orally, but 
only by an agreement in writing and signed by Lessor and Lessee . 
. 21. BINDING ON SUCCESSORS. The provisions in this Lease, and any extensions 
thereof, shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, their heirs persona1 
representatives, successors and assigns in interest of both Lessor and Lessee. 
Nothing contained in this provision shall negate the prohibition of assignment by 
Lessee without Lessor's approval as specified if Section 31 of this Lease. 
22. SUBORDINATION. This Lease shall be subject to, and subordinate and inferior to, 
at all times, the lien of any mortgage, any deed oftrust, or any other method of 
financing or refinancing now or hereafter existing against all or any part of the 
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Property, including without limitation any renewals, modifications; replacements, 
consolidations and extensions of any of the foregoing methods of financing. Lessee 
shall execute and deliver to Lessor or any other person designated by Lessor all 
documents requested by Lessor, or by any mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or other 
security holder of Lessor holding a security interest in the Property or lending funds 
to Lessor with an expectation of acquiring a security interest in the Property, to effect 
such subordination, including any construction financing. Lessee's failure to execute 
and deliver such documentation shaH constitute a default under this Lease. 
23. SIGNATURE AUTHORITY. Lessor and Lessee each make the following 
representations to each other to the extent they are applicable: 
A. Any entity signing this Lease has been legaHy fanned, is in good standing 
under the laws of the State ofidaho, and has all powers necessary to approve 
ofthls transaction. 
B. Each person signing this Lease on behalf of such entity is duly authorized by 
such entity to do so. 
C. No entity signing this Lease is subject to any charter, bylaws, shareholder's 
agreement, partnership agreement, operating agreement, mortg~ge, deed of 
trust, contract, lien, lease, judgement or other requirement or document, 
including any amendments thereto, which prevents the consummation of this 
transaction, or if there are any such things, then such things shall be removed 
or the appropriate consents obtained prior to signing this Lease. 
24. IDAHO LAW GOVERNS. This Lease shall be governed by, and construed and 
enforced in accordance with, the laws of the State ofidaho. 
25. CONSULTATION. Lessor hereby agrees to provide consultation regarding the 
operation and management of the Property, to Lessee> as needed during the term of 
this Lease. 
26. ACCOUNTING. Lessee shall provide to Lessor a quarterly accounting of the 
Business. Each quarterly accounting, which shall cover the prior quarterly period, 
shall be provided to Lessor within thefirst week of the quarter (for example: the first 
quarter accounting shall be due on or before the first week of April; the second 
quarter accounting shall be due on or before the first week of July; the third quarter 
accounting shall be due on or before the first week of October; and the fourth quarter 
accounting shall be due on or before the first week of January). 
27. ASSIGNMENT. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, Lessee may not 
assign or sublet its rights, duties, or obligations under this Lease Agreement without 
first re:ceiving the written consent of Lessor, which may be unreasonably withheld. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set thei~: hands and seals making this 
Lease effective as of the date and year first written in this Lease. 
Lessor: Lessee: 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. 
By: ~ 
~ 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville . ) ~ . 
On this .&yo~, in the year 2004, before me, a Notary Public, personally 
appeared Christa Beguesse Rammell, known or identified to me, to be the managers ofCHRJSTA 
BEGUESSE, fNC., the corporation who executed the instrument or the person who executed the 
instrument on behalfofCHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., and acknowledged to me that CHRISTA 
BEGUESSE, executed the same. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ~ '-1---/--
0n thisl-,~y ~ar 2004, before me, a Notary Public, personally 
appeared APiJt'BEGUESSE):nown or identified to me, to be the President of APRIL 
BEGUESSE, INC., the corporation who executed the instrument or the person who executed the 
instnunent on behalf of APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., and acknowledged to me that APRIL 
BEGUESSE, INC., executed the same. 
W WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day 
and year in this certificate first above written. 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
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Email: j etT@beardstclair .corn 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys fbr Plaintiff 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
PlaintiftYCounterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Ketmeth 
Ranunell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC.'S, 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through counsel of 
record, denies all allegations of Defendant/Counterclaimant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s 
(CBI), Counterclaim not expressly admitted herein and more specifically responds as 
follows: 
1. ABI does not have sufficient infonnation to admit or deny paragraph 1, and 
therefore denies paragraph 1. 
2. ABI denies paragraph 2. 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s, Counterclaim Page 1 
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3. ABI admits paragraph 3. 
4. ABI admits paragraph 4. 
5. ABI does not have sufficient infom1ation to admit or deny paragraph 1, and 
therefore denies paragraph 5. 
6. ABI denies paragraph 6. 
7. ABI denies paragraph 7. 
8. ABI admits that it has not made a payment to CBr since December 2008 
denies the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8. 
9. ABI denies paragraph 9. 
10. ABI denies paragraph 10. 
11. ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs I through 10. 
12. ABI denies paragraph 12. 
13. ABI denies paragraph 13. 
14. ABI denies paragraph 14. 
15. ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs I through 14. 
16. ABI denies paragraph 16. 
17. ABI denies paragraph I 7. 
18. ABI denies paragraph 18. 
19. ABI denies paragraph 19. 
20. ABI incorporates its response.."! to paragraphs I through 19. 
21. ABI denies paragraph 21. 
22. ABI denies paragraph 22. 
23. ABI denies paragraph 23. 
24. ABI denies paragraph 24. 058 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc.'s, Counterclaim Page 2 
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25. ABI denies paragraph 25. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
ABI asserts the following affinnative defenses: 
1. The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. CBI's claims are ban·ed due to fraud. 
3. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
4. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine oflaches. 
5. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
6. CBl's claims are barred because CBI's damages, if any, were caused by 
CBI's own conduct. 
7. CBI has failed to mitigate its damages. 
8. CBI's claims are bmTed because ABI's conduct is not the proximate cause 
of any loss suffered by CBI, if any. 
9. CBI has no damages. 
10. CBl's claims are subject to offsets. 
11. CBI's claims are bmred by the doctrine of waiver. 
12. CBI's claims are ban·ed by the failure of consideration. 
13. CBI's claims are barred by the lack of consideration. 
14. If CBI has been damaged, then those damages are a result of CBI's own 
conduct. 
15. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of mutual mistake. 
16. CBI's claims are barred by an implied in fact contract. 
17. CB I' s claims are barred by an implied in law contract. 




1 Sl:31 p.m. 10-08-2009 
!8. CBI' s claims are batTed based on its own breach of contract including the 
implied covenant of good faith and .fhir dealing. 
19. CBI' s claims are ban·ed based on lack of mutual assent. 
20. CBI's claims are barred based on its own breach of express and implied 
warranties. 
21. CBI's claims are barred based on the claims and facts set forth in ABI's 
Com plaint against CHI, Kenneth Rammell, and the Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammel!. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, ABJ demands judgment: 
1. Dismissing CBI's Counterclaim in its entirety; 
2. Awarding ABl's reasonable attomeys' fees, costs and disbursements of 
defending this action pursuant to, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 oflhe Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, any contract, and any other rule or provision; and 
3. Granting such other and further relief as the Co uti deems just and proper. 
DATED: October 8, 2009. 
0111 /}/' l/} .. !f· 4- ~--····""······· J t I {I~·· b.. ~~/ __ J:t/ .... fZ.::: .. : .. --/ 
·ef D. l}funson 
OfBeard S{. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 certify t11at I am an attomey licensed in the State of Idaho, have my ot1!ce 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on October 8, 2009, I ser·ved a true <L11d correct copy of 
the Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant, Christa Beguesse, Inc's, Counterclaim upon the 
following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 529-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
El o ra/ .. 
·· U.S. Mail ' Hand-Delivered ····· FacsJmile 
[J; U.S. f\-1ail [J;. Hand-Delivered [~J(:.:·simile 
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BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation for Entry of 
Protective Order executed by the parties, and good cause having been found: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall not release, disclose, or 
otherwise cause to be released or disclosed Plaintiffs customer information, financial 
information, tax information, and other confidential business information, to any person 
not a party to the pending action between Plaintiff and the Defendants or to any person 
61A 
not an expert witness in the above action, and shall use such information solely for the 
purposes of this litigation. 
DATED: December l , 2009. 
61 B 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifY that on December j_, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
Protective Order upon the following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
[]}/ . 0 0 
U.S. Ma1l · ··· Hand-Delivered • Facsimile 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax:232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gafiney 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
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Tel: (208) 523-5171 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Ramrnell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
ORDER TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation to Amend 
Pleadings executed by the parties, and good cause having been found: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
I. Plaintiff may file its First Amended Complaint attached to its Motion to Amend 
filed contemporaneously with this stipulation. 
2. Defendants may file their First Amended Counterclaim attached to their motion 
for leave to file amended counterclaim filed with the Court January 8, 201 0_ 
61 D 
Order to Amencl Ple<1clina' nwP ' 
DATED: February j__, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifY that on February i D, 2010, I served a true and c~rrect copy of the Order 
to Amend Pleadings upon the following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
rn( U.S. Mail Q; Hand-Delivered []' Facsimile 
~.S. Mail [J Hand-Delivered Q Facsimile 
61 E 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
vs. 
Kem1eth Rarnmell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammel!, 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc., through its attorneys, alleges and complains 
against the Defendants as follows. 
PARTIES 
1. April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
2. Kenneth Rammel! (Rammell) is an individual residing in Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page I 
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3. Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
4. The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its personal representative, 
Kenneth Rammell, filed an application for informal probate in Bonneville County, Idaho 
on March 11, 2009, Case No. CV-09-1682. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-
514. 
6. Bonneville County is the proper venue for this action under Idaho Code§ 5-
404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. In November 2001, April Beguesse (April) was contacted by her mother, 
Christa Beguesse (Christa), regarding the possibility of April taking over Christa's 
business, CBI. April traveled to Idaho Falls to discuss the possibility with Christa and 
Rammel I. 
8. CBI was in the type setting business. 
9. April believed that Christa was the sole owner ofCBI. Christa had been 
running her business for years before she married Ranunell. 
10. Rammell and Christa were both officers and directors in CBI. 
11. Rammell and Christa told April that she could purchase and take over the 
business. 
12. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed self-
sustaining contract with a customer. 
13. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 2 
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proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000. 
14. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary 
software program unique to CBI' s business. 
15. Rammell and Christa represented that CBI owned intellectual property. 
16. Rammell and Christa indicated that they would sell the business for $12,000 a 
month for eight years. 
17. Rarnmell stated that they were being very generous and that April would be a 
fool not to accept the offer. 
18. Initially, April worked for CBI as an employee. 
19. In November 2003, April formedABI. 
20. Both Rarnmell and Christa indicated on many occasions that the assets of CBI 
would be left to April when Christa died. 
21. In February 2004, ABI commenced making monthly payments to CBI for 
$12,000 month. 
22. ABI took ownership of all past and current debts of CBI and started operating 
the business. ABI paid all the bills including the monthly rent to a third party. 
23. ABI purchased all new computers, printers, scanners, phone system, updated 
programs and hardware and updated the office furniture. 
24. Rammell indicated that he had a contract that his brother had used for his 
business that Rammell had altered. 
25. Christa had Rarnmell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case of 
Christa's death payments would continue. 
26. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 3 
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27. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease after 
Christa's death. 
28. Rammell and Christa repeatedly made the representations alleged in the 
previous paragraphs. 
29. Based on the representations ofRammell and Christa, April ultimately signed 
a document entitled "lease agreement". The purported agreement is between CBI and 
ABI and made effective January 1, 2004. 
30. The purported agreement provides: 
BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT. For and in consideration of the promises 
set forth in this Lease and the payment of the rents specified in this Lease, 
Lessor leases, demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee leases, 
demises and rents from Lessor, that certain business described in Exhibit 
'A' attached hereto (the 'Business"), that certain equipment described in 
Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. (Such business and equipment identified in 
Exhibits 'A' and 'B', shall collectively be referred to herein as 'the 
Property', unless otherwise indicated. 
31. Exhibits A and B attached to the purported agreement were completely blank. 
32. The purported agreement required CBI to provide consulting services to ABI. 
33. ABI continued making monthly payments to CBI in an amount of$12,000 
until November 1, 2008. 
34. ABI also paid Christa for consulting and professional services. 
35. On November 10, 2008, Christa died. 
36. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April. 
37. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of Christa's 
possessions go to Rammel!. 
3 8. After visiting an attorney after her mother's death, April learned for the first 
time that the representations made by Rammell and Christa alleged in the previous 
paragraphs were false. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 4 
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39. There was no guaranteed contract with a major customer. Rather, the 
customer could leave at any time. 
40. The library referenced by Rammell and Christa is actually owned by the 
customer. 
41. The referenced proprietary software program was a software program that 
could be purchased off the shelf. 
42. On March 1, 2009, April moved to Nevada. 
43. On March 11, 2009, Rammell applied for informal probate for Christa's estate 
in Bonneville County, Idaho, Case No. CV-09-1682. 
44. On April13, 2009, Christa's estate on behalf of CBI filed a complaint against 
ABI and April individually in Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A587645. The Nevada 
complaint seeks to enforce the purported agreement. 
45. The Nevada case was dismissed. 
COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
46. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
47. Critical portions to the purported lease contract between ABI and CBI were 
left blank. 
48. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because there was never mutual 
assent. 
49. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because the purported agreement is 
missing essential terms. 
50. ABI and CBI never contemplated a lease of the business but rather 
contemplated a purchase of certain CBI assets. 
51. This Court has the power to declare that there is no lease contract between 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 5 
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ABI and CBI pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201. 
52. ABI is an interested person as defined by Idaho Code § 10-1202. 
53. This Court should declare that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI. 
54. Alternatively, the lease contract should be reformed to meet the intent of 
parties. 
55. To the extent the Court finds an enforceable contract, the contract should be 
rescinded due to the defendants' fraudulent conduct and all monies paid should be 
refunded. 
56. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT TWO: FRAUD 
57. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
58. The defendants acting individually and on behalf of CBI made numerous 
representations to ABI and April including but not limited to the following: 
a. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed self-
sustaining contract with a major customer. 
b. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000. 
c. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary 
software program unique to CBI's business. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 6 
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d. Rammell and Christa represented that there was intellectual property 
unique to CBI. 
e. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
f. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
after Christa's death. 
59. The defendants failed to disclose that: 
a. There was no guaranteed contract and that the major customer could leave 
at any time for any reason. 
b. The library of proprietary files was in fact owned by the major customer 
and not CBI. 
c. That the software program utilized by CBI could be purchased off the 
shelf. 
d. That CBI did not own any intellectual property. 
e. That Ramrnell was an owner of CBI. 
60. The statements and omissions of the defendants were false. 
61. The statements and omissions of the defendants were material. 
62. The defendants knew the statements and omissions were false. 
63. The defendants intended thatABI rely on the false statements and omissions. 
64. ABI and April did not know the statements and omissions were false. 
65. ABI relied on the statements and omissions by signing the purported 
agreement and by paying $12,000 a month to CBI from February 2004 to November 
2008. 
66. Such reliance by ABI was justifiable. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 7 
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67. As a result of the defendants' false statements and omissions, ABI has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
68. The defendants' conduct constitutes affirmative fraud, fraud by omission, and 
fraud in the inducement. 
69. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT THREE: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
70. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
71. The defendants and ABI had a relationship of trust and confidence because 
Christa, Rammell, and April were members of the same family and CBI and ABI were in 
contractual negotiations and ultimately signed an agreement. 
72. The defendants breached this relationship of trust and confidence. 
73. ABI is not required to establish that the defendants' knew their statement and 
omissions were false or that the defendants intended ABI rely on their false statements 
and omissions. 
74. The defendants conduct constitutes constructive fraud. 
75. As a result of the defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amow1t to 
be proven at trial. 
76. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idal1o Code §§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT FOUR: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
77. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 8 
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78. The defendants promised to sell or assign several assets ofCBI to ABI in 
exchange for payment of $12,000/month. 
79. These assets include but are not limited to: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
80. The parties' exchange of promises constitutes a binding contract. 
81. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract and is not in 
material breach. 
82. The defendants materially breached the contract by failing to provide the 
agreed upon assets and failing to provide consulting services required under the contract. 
83. The defendants conduct constitutes a failure of consideration. 
84. The defendants conduct also constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
85. The defendants' material breaches are the direct and proximate cause of 
damages to ABI. 
86. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
87. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT FIVE: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 
88. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
89. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 9 
10 116 
070 
2085235069 Beard St. Clair Beard St. Clair 02-17-2010 
90. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract. 
91. As part of the contract the defendants expressly represented and warranted 
that CBI could transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
92. This wananty was a material term of the contract and its breach constitutes a 
material breach of the contract. 
93. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-312, in every contract for sale there is a 
warranty of title that the title is good and its transfer is rightful. 
94. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 28-2-313,28-12-210, any affirmation of fact or 
promise made by the seller or lessor to the buyer or lessee, which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
95. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-313, any description of the goods which is 
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the description. 
96. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-12-211, there is a warranty that no other person 
holds a claim to or interest in the goods. 
97. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and the assets transfened, if 
any, did not conform. 
98. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to ABI. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 10 
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99. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
100. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SIX: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
101. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
102. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets. 
1 03. ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract. 
104. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that CBI could 
transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
105. This warranty was a material term ofthe contract and its breach 
constitutes a material breach of the contract. 
106. As part of the contract, the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets 
to be transferred would be merchantable, that is to say that it would pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; that it would be fit for the ordinary 
purpose of such goods; and that it would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact 
made. 
107. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets 
was fit for a particular purpose, that is to say that the defendants knew the purpose for 
which ABI intended it and that the ABI was relying upon the defendants to furnish the 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 11 
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assets, and warranted thus impliedly warranted that the assets were suitable for that 
pmpose. 
108. Contrary to the defendants' warranties, CBI could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and such assets did not 
conform or were not suitable for ABI' s purposes. 
109. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to 
ABI. 
110. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
111. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedme 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SEVEN: UNJUST ENIRCHMENT 
112. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
113. ABI provided a benefit to the defendants by paying $12,000 a month from 
February 2004 to November 2008. 
114. Because ABI did not get what was promised, it would be unjust for CBI to 
retain the benefit. 
115. As a result of defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
116. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedme 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT EIGHT: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
117. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page 12 
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118. The defendants took the position that April would no longer make any 
payments after Christa's death. 
119. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case 
of Christa's death payments would continue. 
120. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI's assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
121. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
after Christa's death. 
122. On November 10, 2008, Christa died. 
123. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April or ABI. 
124. A holographic paragraph was produced by Ramrnell that states all of 
Christa's possessions go to Rammell. 
125. ABI relied on the representations to its disadvantage. 
126. It would be unconscionable to allow the defendants to maintain the 
inconsistent position that payments were to continue after Christa's death. 
127. The defendants should be estopped from claiming that the payments must 
continue. 
128. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. Judgment against the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. A declaration that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI. 
3. An order estopping the defendants from claiming payments should continue. 
4. An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to agreement Idaho Code§§ 12-
120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
5. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 
PURSUANT TO RULE 38 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY 
Dated: February 17, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho, have my office 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on February 17, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand upon the following as indicated 
below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax:232-6109 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 529-1300 
1!;11, U.S. Mail ~-Hand-Delivered ~acsimile 
ri51< 
ILl~ 
"""~ U.S. Mail Q Hand-Delivered ~simile 
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 







KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 
personal representative, Kenneth ) 
Rammel!. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ____________________________ ) 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually and as personal 
representative of the ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE RAMMELL, and CHRISTA 
BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, by and through their attorney of record, Marcus W. Nye 
of the firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and in response to the Complaint of 
the Plaintiff filed herein, admit, deny and allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these 
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Defendants, and should be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted 
herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 8 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
3. In response to paragraph 9 ofthe Amended Complaint Defendants deny that "April 
believed that Christa was the sole owner of CBI" and admits that Christa had been running her 
business for years before she married Rammel!. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations ofparagraphlO of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 11 through 15 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
6. In response to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants state that a contract was 
entered into between Christa Beguesse, Inc. and April Beguesse, Inc., the terms of which contract 
speak for themselves. 
7. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Complaint. 
8. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Complaint. 
9. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 21 and 22 ofthe Complaint 
10. Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the 
allegations of paragraph 23 ofthe Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
11. Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint. 
12. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and state further 
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that the contract speaks for itself. 
13. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the Complaint. 
14. In response to paragraph 29, Defendants deny that April signed the contract "based 
on the representations of Rarnmell and Christa." Defendants admit that April signed a contract 
entitled "Lease Agreement" between CBI and ABI, effective January 1, 2004. 
15. In response to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Complaint, Defendant states that the 
alleged contract speaks for itself. 
16. The Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 32 through 37, and specifically 
avert that a holographic Will was found. 
17. Defendants deny the allegation of paragraph 3 8. 
18. In response to paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, to the extent that it alleges 
the existence of a contract between CBI and a customer, said contract speaks for itself. 
19. In response to paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants deny ever having 
made reference to a "library" owned by CBI, or any representations contrary to the facts. To the 
extent that this paragraph 40 may make allegations regarding the typesetting working files for the 
customer's products, the Defendants deny the allegation that these files are owned by the customer. 
20. Defendants deny the allegations ofparagraph 41 ofthe Amended Complaint. 
21. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 42 through 45 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
COUNT 1: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
22. In response to paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, the Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 45. 
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23. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 4 7 through 51. 
24. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 52 of the Complaint. 
25. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 2: FRAUD 
26. In response to paragraph 57 ofthe Complaint, Defendants restate their responses to 
paragraphs 1 through 56. 
27. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 58 through 69. 
COUNT 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
28. In response to paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 69. 
29. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 71 through 76 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 4: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
30. In response to paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1-76. 
31. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 78 and 79. 
32. In response to paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant admits that the 
parties entered into a binding contract, pursuant to which the parties performed from January 2004 
until November 2008, and that the tenns of the contract speak for themselves. 
3 3. In response to paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint. Defendant admits that ABI 
substantially performed its obligations under the contract until November 2008, at which time it 
ceased performing under the contract, and is currently in material breach thereof. 
34. Defendants deny the allegations of 82 through 87 of the Amended Complaint. 
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COUNT 5: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 
35. In response to paragraph 88 ofthe Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 1 
through 87. 
36. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint. 
3 7. In response to paragraph 90, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is now in material breach 
of its obligations under the contract. 
38. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 91 and 92. 
39. In response to paragraphs 93 through 96 of the Amended Complaint, the Idaho 
Statutes referenced therein speak for themselves and are the best evidence of the statutory 
requirements. Said paragraphs do not otherwise appear to require a response from the Defendants. 
40. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 97 through 100. 
COUNT 6: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
41. In response to paragraph 1 0 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 100. 
42. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 102. 
43. In response to paragraph 103, Defendants admit that ABI substantially performed its 
obligations under the contract through November 2008, but since that time is in material breach of 
the contract. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 1 04 through 111. 
COUNT 7: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
45. In response to paragraph 112 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants restate their 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 111. 
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46. In response to paragraph 113, Defendants admitthatABI paid Defendants $12,000.00 
per month for February 2004 to November 2008. Defendants deny all other allegations of paragraph 
113. 
4 7. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 114 through 116 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 8: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
48. In response to paragraph 117 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant restates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 116. 
49. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 118 through 121 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
50. Defendants admit the allegation of paragraphs 122 through 123 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
51. In response to Paragraph 124 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants aver that a 
holographic will was produced. 
52. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 125 through 128 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable statutes of frauds, including but not 
limited to Idaho Code§ 9-505, § 15-2-701, and§ 28-2-201. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable of statutes of limitations, including 
but not limited to I. C. § 5-216, § 5-217, § 5-218, and§§ 15-3-801, et seq. 
TIDRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
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Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgement, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of contract, 
breach of express and implied warranties and unjust emichrnent and quasi-estoppel are barred by the 
doctrine of laches. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its obligations and duties under the contract. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants expressly disclaimed in the contract all express and implied warranties. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims should be barred by Plaintiffs material breach of the contract at issue in 
this matter. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, 
Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and are entitled to a reasonable fee therefor pursuant to Idaho Code, 
including, but not limited to, I. C.§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and paragraph 17 ofthe Lease Agreement 
between the parties. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that judgment be entered in this action declaring the 
respective rights and duties of the parties, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice, 
awarding the Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and granting Defendants such 
other and further relief as is just under the circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
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COMES NOW, Defendant /Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
by and through counsel, and for its Counterclaim against the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, April 
Beguesse, Inc., and Idaho corporation, as follows: 
PARTIES & JURISDICTION 
1. Defendant/Counterclaimant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (herein "CBI"), is a corporation 
in good standing registered under the laws of the State of Idaho, having its principal place of 
business in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. 
2. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant April Beguesse, Inc. (herein "ABI"), is a corporation in 
good standing registered under the laws of the State ofidaho, having its principal place of business 
in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. The actions, or failures to act, giving rise to this cause of action occurred or should 
have occurred in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court. 
BACKGROUND 
5. For several years, CBI operated a profitable business and acquired assets for the 
operation ofthe business. 
6. On or before January 1, 2004, CBI entered into an agreement with ABI, pursuant to 
which ABI agreed to lease the business and assets (collectively "the Assets") from CBI for a period 
of eight consecutive years commencing January 1, 2004. The Lease Agreement (herein "the 
Agreement") between CBI and ABI required ABI to make rent payments to CBI in the amount of 
$12,000 per month, beginning in January 2004 and continuing for ninety-six months, through 
December 31, 2011. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and 
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7. The Agreement provided that the Assets leased to ABI were to be described in 
exhibits attached thereto. Even though the parties inadvertently failed to specifically describe the 
leased Assets in the exhibits, the parties performed their obligations under the Agreement for a 
period of almost 5 years, until November 2008. During the years of performance, ABI used CBI's 
Assets, and ABI also made the required lease payments to CBI, thereby establishing through the 
parties' conduct and dealings the specific assets that were intended to be the subject of the 
Agreement. 
8. ABI has failed or refused to make the rent payments to CBI after November 2008, 
despite having been given notice of default. CBI never received payment from ABI for December 
2008 or any month thereafter. 
9. Since November 2008, ABI has continued to use CBI' s Assets to operate the business 
that was the subject of the Agreement. 
10. On information and belief, since it stopped making the rent payments to CBI, ABI 
has continued to make profits from the use of CBI' s Assets. 
COUNT I 
(Breach of Contract) 
11. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by reference 
and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
12. The above-described Agreement is a legal and binding contract properly formed 
between CBI and ABI. 
13. ABI's failure or refusal to make the rent payments as required by the Agreement is 
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a material breach of the Agreement. 
14. CBI has suffered damages, and continues to suffer damages, as a result of ABI's 
breach, in the amount of $12,000 per month for unpaid rent, beginning with December 2008 and 
continuing until such time as the breach is cured or the lease expires, together with interest accruing 
on each payment from the due date at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. 
COUNT II 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
15. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by reference 
and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
16. ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use CBI' s Assets that were the 
subject of the lease Agreement even though it has failed to make the rent payments therefor. 
17. ABI continues to derive a valuable economic benefit from its wrongful use of the 
CBI's Assets that were the subject of the lease Agreement. 
18. CBI has conferred a benefit upon ABI, which benefit has been appreciated by ABI, 
and it would be inequitable for ABI to retain the benefit without payment for the value thereof to 
CBI. 
19. ABI has been unjustly enriched and is liable to CBI for the value of the benefit 
conferred, in an amount to be established at trial. 
COUNT III 
(Constructive Trust) 
20. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs of this Counterclaim by reference 
and incorporates the same as if set forth fully. 
21. ABI has remained in possession of and continues to use the Assets that were the 
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subject of the Agreement with CBI even though it has failed to make full payment to CBI for those 
Assets. 
22. ABI's continued use of the Assets without full payment to CBI is wrongful. 
23. ABI continues to derive an economic benefit from its wrongful use ofthe Assets that 
were the subject ofthe Agreement. 
24. CBI has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to a constructive trust in its favor 
for all profits earned by ABI derived from the Assets that were the subject of the Agreement with 
CBI and for which ABI has not made full payment. 
COUNT IV 
(Uniform Trade Secrets Act) 
25. CBI reasserts the allegations in all prior paragraphs ofthis Counterclaim by reference 
and incorporates the same as if set forth fully herein. 
26. The assets given by CBI to Plaintiff ABI in January 2004, included but are not 
necessarily limited to its working files, its computer data bases, "scripts" designed for use with the 
Adobe Pagemaker type-setting program used by CBI to automate certain common procedures 
performed for its customer, the business relationship between CBI and its customer, and know how 
concerning the operation and the business relationship. These assets were given to April Beguesse 
in confidence by CBI and constitute trade secrets within the meaning of the Idaho Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, Idaho Code §48-801 et seq. 
27. Plaintiff ABI misrepresented its intention to pay the amounts specified in the contract 
at issue in this case in exchange for the assets ofCBI, and has now obtained control ofthe assets 
without paying the agreed-on price, through false and fraudulent means. 
28. Plaintiff ABI has alleged in its Complaint herein that certain of the assets transferred 
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to it from CBI are actually the property of its customer, The Rutter Group, Inc., a division of West 
Publishing Company. Although it is not the case that the customer owns these assets, the allegation 
that such is true is an indication that ABI may consider itself obliged to transfer possession of said 
trade secrets on demand by the customer, which would compromise the value of these trade secrets, 
to the detriment of Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI. In the alternative, the allegation is made in 
furtherance of ABI' s scheme to misappropriate said trade secrets through false and fraudulent means. 
29. The actions of ABI in misrepresenting its intentions, in attempting to obtain control 
of CBI' s trade secrets through false and fraudulent means, and in failing to make payments as 
required under the contract constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets within the meaning of the 
Idaho Trade Secrets Act. 
30. If ABI were to tum over possession of the trade secrets to the customer, ABI would 
lose its sole customer and would be unable to make payments required under the contract, which 
would cause damage to Defendant CBI. 
31. Plaintiff ABI' s belief that it is obligated to tum possession of the trade secrets over 
to the customer threatens the further misappropriation of CBI' s trade secrets. 
32. Misappropriation of the trade secrets has caused and will cause irreparable damage 
to Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI. 
33. CBI is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets to 
Plaintiffs customer or others who could gain economic benefit from them, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§48-802. 
34. CBI is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the use of misappropriated trade secrets 
by Plaintiff ABI, to the extent that the misappropriation continues, or, in the alternative, if 
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exceptional circumstances are found, CBI is entitled to an injunction conditioning future use of the 
trade secrets upon payment of a reasonable royalty for a sufficient time to ensure full payment of 
amounts due CBI in exchange for said trade secrets, pursuant to I.C. §48-802(2). 
35. Defendant/Countclaimant CBI has been damaged by Plaintiff's misappropriation of 
trade secrets in the amount of$12,000.00 per month beginning November 1, 2208 and continuing 
through the period ofthe contract at issue in this case, together with interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees incurred by Defendant. 
36. Plaintiff ABI has been unjustly emiched by its misappropriation of CBI's trade 
secrets. 
3 7. The actions ofPlaintiff ABI in misappropriating CBI' s trade secrets have been willful 
and malicious, and CBI is entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Idaho Code §48-803(2). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
38. CBI has been required to retain the assistance of the law firm Racine, Olson, Nye, 
Budge & Bailey, Chartered, to pursue and protect its legal interests related to this matter and is 
entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code, including§§ 12-120(3) 
and 12-121, and pursuant to paragraph 1 7 of the Lease Agreement between the parties. 
WHEREFORE, CBI prays for judgment against Counterdefendant ABI as follows: 
A. For a money judgment in the amount of $12,000 per month, beginning with 
December 2008 through such time as ABI cures its default or is no longer obligated to make 
payments under the Lease Agreement; or in the alternative, for the value of the benefit CBI has 
conferred upon ABI for which it is unjust for ABI to retain, in an amount to be established at trial; 
plus interest thereon from each payment due date at the rate of 8% per annum. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMA.l'ID FOR JURY TRIAL- 13 
08~3 
B. For a constructive trust in favor of CBI for all profits earned by ABI from its use of 
the Assets it received pursuant to the Lease Agreement with CBI since November 2008. 
C. For CBI's costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees incurred in this action. 
D. For an order granting injunctive relief prohibiting ABI from disclosing trade secrets 
identified herein to The Rutter Group, West Publishing Company, other customers of ABI, or other 
persons who may derive economic value from them; 
E. For an order granting injunctive relief precluding the use of ABI oftrade secrets given 
to it by CBI, or, in the alternative, an order finding exceptional circumstances and conditioning 
ABI's continued use ofthe trade secrets on payment of a reasonable royalty to CBI for such time as 
necessary to pay those amounts due CBI under the contract at issue in this case; 
F. For damages for misappropriation and exemplary damages in an amount to be proven 
at trial, pursuant to Idaho Code §48-803; 
G. For Attorney's fees, cost, interest 
H. For further relief as the Court finds just under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant Kenneth Rammel, individually and as personal representative of the estate of 
Christa Beguesse Rammel, and Defendant/Counterclaimant CBI hereby request a trial by jury on all 
issues so triable. 
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Dated this f(} day ofMarch, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .j/Ltf;;y of March, 2010, I served a true, correct and 
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
~.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7 495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 





DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNE~LLECOUNTYIDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammel!, 
Defendants/Counterc!aimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintift/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through counsel of 
record, denies a:I allegations ofDefendants/Counterclaimants', Kenneth Ranm1ell, 
Chtista Beguesse, Inc., The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell (collectively CBl), 
Counterclaim not expressly admitted herein and more specifically responds as follows: 
I. ABI does not have sufficient information to admit or deny paragraph l, and 
therefore denies paragraph I. 
2. ABI denies paragraph 2. 
~ 
\ 
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3. ABI admits paragraph 3. 
4. ABI admits paragraph 4. 
5. ABI does not have sufficient infonnation to admit or deny paragraph 5, and 
therefore denies paragraph 5. 
6. ABI denies paragraph 6. 
7. ABI denies paragraph 7. 
8. ABI admits that it has not made a payment to CBI since December 2008 
denies the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8. 
9. ABI denies paragraph 9. 
10. ABI denies paragraph 10. 
II. ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through I 0. 
12. ABI denies paragraph 12. 
13. ABI denies paragraph 13. 
14. ABI denies paragraph 14. 
15. ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through [ 4. 
1 G. ABI denies paragraph 16. 
17. ABI denies paragraph 17. 
18. ABI denies paragraph 18. 
19. ABI denies paragraph 19. 
20. AB I incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 19. 
21. AB I denies paragraph 21. 
22. ABI denies paragraph 22. 
23. ABI denies paragraph 23. 
24. ABI denies paragraph 24. 
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25. ABI incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 though 24. 
26. ABI denies paragraph 26. 
27. ABI denies paragraph 27. 
28. ABI denies paragraph 28. 
29. ABI denies paragraph 29. 
30. ABI denies paragraph 30. 
3 1. ABI denies paragraph 31. 
32. ABI denies paragraph 32. 
33. ABI denies paragraph 33. 
34. ABI denies paragraph 34. 
35. ABI denies paragraph 35. 
36. ABI denies paragraph 36. 
3 7. ABI denies paragraph 3 7. 
38. ABI denies paragraph 38. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
ABI asserts the following affitmative defenses: 
l p.m. 03-29-2010 
1. The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. CBI's claims are barred due to fraud. 
3. CBI's claims are baned by the doctrine of estoppel. 
4. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
5. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
6. CBI's claims are batTed because CBI's damages, if any, were caused by 
CBI's own conduct 
7. CBI has failed to mitigate its damages. 
4/7 
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8. CBI's claims are barred because ABI's conduct is not the proximate cause 
of any loss suffered by CBI, if any. 
9. CBI has no damages. 
10. CBI 's claims are subject to offsets. 
11. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
12. CBI's claims are barred by the failure of consideration. 
13. CBI' s claims are barred by the lack of consideration. 
14. CBI's claims are barred based on the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, Idaho Code 
§ 48-801 et seq. 
15. CBI's Unifonn Trade Secrets Act claim is barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations, Idaho Code§ 48-805. 
16. CBI's claims are barred by the doctrine of mutual mistake. 
17. CBI' s claims are barred by an implied in fact contract. 
1 8. CBI's claims are barred by an implied in law contract. 
19. CBI's claims are baJTed based on its own breach of contract including the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
20. CBI's claims are barred based on lack of mutual assent. 
21. CBI' s claims are barred based on its own breach of express and implied 
wananties. 
22. CBI's claims are batTed based on the claims and facts set fmth in ABI's 
Amended Complaint against CBI, Kenneth Rammell, and the Estate of Christa Beguesse 
Rammel1. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 




02:" 1 p.m. 03-29-2010 
!. Dismissing CBI's Counterclaim in its entirety; 
2. Awarding ABI's reasonable attorneys' fees, costs aml disbursements of 
defi:nding this action pursuant to, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, any contract, and any other rule or provision; and 
3. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED: March 29, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State ofldaho, have my oftice 
located m Idaho Falls, Idaho and on March 29, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of 
the PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM upon 
the tollowing as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Comthouse 
605 N Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 529-1300 
EJ u s "1 '1 []; .I • d [k](.F ' ' ·' . • r> a1 ·· ·• hand-Del!vere ··· · . acsumle 
/ 
[f:]_ U.S. Mail fq;: Hand-Delivered ~ Facsimile 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 















10 31 f)'J r J 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
Case No. CV-09 2767 
Pursuant to Rule 16, I.R.C.P. I it is hereby ordered that a 
status conference be conducted by and between the Court and the 
counsel of record in regard to the above-entitled case on April 
22, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
It is further ordered that at least one of the attorneys for 
each party participating in said status conference have authority 
to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all 
matters that the parties may reasonably anticipate being 
discussed. (See Rule 16 (b) and Rule 16 (c)). Counsel shall also 
be prepared to furnish the Court with available dates for a pre-
trial conference and trial setting. 
The Plaintiff is directed to initiate the telephone 
conference call to the Court. 
extension 1340. 
The telephone number is 529 1350 
Dated this J \ day of March, 2010 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _2uL day of March, 2010, that I 
I 
mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
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ORDER AND NOTICE 
SETTING JURY TRIAL 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
) 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by ) 
Its qualified personal ) 





Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the following pre-trial schedule shall govern all proceedings in 
this case: 
ORDER 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. A Pre-trial Conference is scheduled January 11 1 
2011 at 8:30 a.m. 
2. Jury trial is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on January 25, 
2011. Trial may go into a second week. In that case 
the second week of trial will continue on Tuesday/ 
February 1, 2011. 
3. Dispositive motions must be filed at least 60 days 
prior to trial. 
4. Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, including 
opinions and conclusions must be filed at least 100 
days before trial. Defendant(s) expert witness 
disclosure including opinions and conclusions must be 
filed at least 80 days before trial. 
5. All discovery shall be completed 45 days prior to 
trial. 
6. The parties and their attorneys shall attend a 
mediation session before a qualified attorney mediator 
97 c 
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or district judge selected by the parties. Unless 
excused by Mediator, lead trial counsel, the parties 
and a representative of any insurer of a party shall 
attend the mediation with adequate settlement 
authority. Mediation should be completed at least 45 
days prior to trial. 
II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no 
later than three (3) days prior to the pre-trial conference: 
1. File a list of names of persons who may be called to 
testify. 
2. File a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be 
offered into evidence 
3. File a brief citing legal authorities upon which the 
party relies as to each issue of law to be litigated. 
4. File proposed jury instructions. The parties need not 
submit IDJI2 instruction numbers 1.01 through 1.43. 
All instructions shall be prepared in accordance with 
I.R.C.P. 51(a). 
III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later 
than seven (7) days before trial: 
1. File any objections to the jury instructions requested 
by an opponent specifying the instruction and the 
grounds for the objection. 
IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1. Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last 
required disclosure shall immediately be disclosed to 
the court and opposing counsel by filing and service 
stating the date upon which the same was discovered. 
2. No witnesses shall testify and no exhibits shall be 
admitted into evidence at trial other than those 
disclosed 1 listed and submitted to the clerk of the 
court in accordance with this order. 
3. On the first day of trial deposit with the clerk of 
court all exhibits to be introduced. Plaintiff shall 
pre-mark and staple exhibits in numerical sequence as 
outlined in Plaintiff 1 S exhibit list and Defendant's 
exhibits shall be pre-marked and stapled in 
alphabetical sequence as outlined in Defendant's 
exhibit list. Pages of exhibits shall be stapled, with 
a sticker placed on the first page of the actual 
exhibit. 
4. This order shall control the course of this action 
97 D 
ORDER 
unless modified for good cause shown to prevent 
manifest injustice. 
5. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for 
violation of this order. 
DATED this ·2 "'2..- day of April, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~,day of April, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
ORDER 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Jeni'ey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
1 ,'l IOU 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:ll ~-:~UTY 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintitf/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
De fendants/Counterc laimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
NOTICE REGARDING REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS DEEMED ADMITTED 
COMES NOW, Plaintif£/Counterdefendant, April Beguesse, Inc., by and through 
its counsel of record, Jeffrey D. Brunson, and the law firm of Beard St. Clair Gafthey P A, 
and provides notice to this Court and the opposing party that pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 
36(b)(d), Defendants/Counterclaimants failed to respond to the attached Requests for 
Admission within the thirty day response period, and thus said Requests for Admissions 
are deemed admitted and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant intends to use said admissions at the 
time of triaL 




DATED: May 24,2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho, have my office 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on May 24, 2010, I served a tme and correct copy of the 
NOTICE REGARDING REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS DEEMED ADMITTED upon 
the following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital A venue 




GJJ U.S. Mail UQ, Hand-Delivered n Facsimile 
/ 
// 
ffiJl U.S. Mail ~~ Hand-Delivered ([~· Facsimile 
3/12 
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Notice Regarding Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted Page 2 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~2010 JUL 12 PM 3: 55 
DIS TRlCT COURT 
!1A GISTR ATE DIVISION 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
IDAHO 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This matter having come before the Court by means ofthe Stipulation for 
Amended Protective Order executed by the parties, and good cause having been found: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties are to be bound by the provisions of 
the Protective Order entered by the Court on December 8, 2009, which prohibits public 
- _..., 
disclosure of certain categories of documents and limits use of said \fq;~~!S'.~'I!f !E \DI '\ 
information contained therein to this litigation. I 8 
\ ______ _ 
97 I 
The parties are further ordered that the following categories of documents, which 
have been previously produced, or which may be exchanged, or produced during this 
litigation by the parties in response to discovery requests are protected in that the 
documents and information contained therein can be used by the parties for the purpose 
of this litigation, and this litigation only, and for no other purpose now or in the future, 
and the same shall not be disclosed to any person or to any entity who is not involved or 
associated with this litigation as party, witness, or consultant for a party, or as a person 
who has prepared or assisted in the preparation of such documents, and/ or as a person to 
whom document or copy thereof was addressed or delivered, provided any such non-
party witnesses or other such persons to whom disclosure is permissible hereunder must 
agree, prior to disclosure, to abide by the terms of the Stipulation and with the protective 
orders entered by the Court: 
1. Any and all documents and/or information pertaining to 
macros/commands/scripts used by Plaintiff in her business; 
2. Any pricing information used by Plaintiff in her business; 
3. Any financial infonnation of April Beguesse or April Beguesse, Inc.; 
4. Any tax information of April Beguesse or April Beguesse, Inc.; 
5. Any wage or other personal financial information of April Beguesse; 
6. Any billing records; 
7. Any documents and/or information identifYing, discussing, or referring to 
clients or customers of April Beguesse, Inc;. 
8. Any financial statements of April Beguesse, Inc.; 
9. Any documents containing, discussing, or referring to bank accounts, financial 
accounts, and/or other financial information; 97 J 
10. April Beguesse's social security number. 
The parties shall not file with the Court any of the foregoing categories of 
documents produced or exchanged until such time as the parties have reconvened with 
the Court and obtained further orders regarding the same and/or the parties have 
stipulated to the same. The parties may mark such documents intended to be protected by 
the terms of this Stipulation and by any related protective order entered by the Court as 
"CONFIDENTIAL." Any use of the confidential documents or information subject to 
this Stipulation for any purpose other than this litigation shall be a breach of the 
Stipulation and any corresponding protective order. 
The protective orders entered by the Court are binding upon all of the parties to 
this action, the undersigned attorneys for each party, any recipient of the above-
referenced documents and information, and any successor, executor, personal or legal 
representative, heir, assignee, employee, or agent over which any party or attorney or 
recipient of the documents and information covered by the Stipulation and related 
protective order may have control. 
In the event that any of the above-referenced documents and/or information 
produced or exchanged are disclosed in contravention of this Stipulation and any related 
protective order entered by the Court, either willfully or inadvertently, such documents 
and information shall not lose their protected status through such disclosure, and the 
parties shall take all steps reasonably required to assure their continued confidentiality. 
After termination of this case, the provisions of the Stipulation and any related 
protective orders entered by the Court shall continue to be binding. The parties agree that 
all documents produced pursuant to the foregoing, and any copies, shall be returned to the 
producing party at the conclusion of this matter. 97 K 
DATEIY.~ f~ 2010. 
CLERK'S NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I certifY that on~ Jl. 20 I 0, I served a true and correct copy of the Amended 
Protective Order upon the following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
rn! [l [J ·· x U.S. Mail ' Hand-Delivered ·. "' Facsimile 
~ . 0:· . [} .. 
U.S. Mall ·"" Hand-Delivered ·· Facstm1le 
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) MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. ) Case No. CV-09-2767 
) 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. , an ) 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by ) 
Its qualified personal ) 





On the 8th day of October, 2010, Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and motion to strike, Plaintiff's motion to 
strike came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, 
in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson and Mr. John Avondet appeared for and on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and motion to strike. Mr. Avondet presented argument in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Brunson 
presented argument in opposition to the motion to st ke. Mr. 
Alexander presented rebuttal argument. 
97 M 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
ision as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 
caused a true and correct copy of 
be delivered to the following: 
day of October, 2010, I 
the foregoing document to 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kem1eth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Parties have also moved to strike certain affidavits. Following the 
hearing and oral argument, the Court took the motions under advisement. 
I. FACTS 
Defendant Kenneth Rammell (Rammell) and Christa Beguesse (Christa) owned 
and operated Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI), an Idaho corporation that provided 
typesetting services to a single customer, the Rutter Group (Rutter). In November 2001, 
Christa and Rammell approached Christa's daughter, April Beguesse (April), with a 
proposal to purchase the business. The Parties dispute some of the details of the proposal. 
CBI contends that Christa and Rammell "proposed to April that she work for CBI for two 
years, learn all aspects of the business, and then taken [sic] over in January 2004, after 
MEMORANDUM DECISION- 1 098 
which she would make payments to CBI of $12,000 per month for eight years." Defs'. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, Sept 3, 2010, ~ 9. At the end ofthe eight years, "April 
would own the business and all of its assets." ld. at ~ 16. ABI essentially agrees with 
CBI' s version of the proposal, but claims that Christa and Rammell promised the 
following additional items: (1) Christa's consulting services for eight years; (2) a library 
of files valued at over one million dollars; (3) a guaranteed contractual relationship with 
Rutter; ( 4) proprietary software; and (5) other intellectual property. ABI also alleges that 
the monthly payments to CBI were to cease on Christa's death and that Christa was to 
leave the business to April as an inheritance. 
In January 2002, April moved to Idaho Falls and began working for CBL She 
continued working for CBI through 2003. In January 2004, the business was 
"transitioned" to Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), an Idaho corporation wholly-
owned by April, which began paying $12,000 per month to CBL In October 2004, 
Christa and April (on behalf of their companies) signed a document titled "Lease 
Agreement", which states that it was "entered and made effective as the 1st day of 
January, 2004." The Agreement is structured as a "lease" of property, with "rental" 
payments of $12,000 required each month for eight years. The Agreement states that the 
property being leased includes the "business" and "equipment" described in exhibits A 
and B. However, the exhibits are left completely blank. The Agreement requires CBI to 
provide consultation to ABI throughout the lease term. Although the Parties acknowledge 
that ABI was to own the business, the Lease Agreement provides that at the end of the 
lease period, " ... the Lesee shall surrender the Property to Lessor 
Agreement,~ 9. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION- 2 
" Lease 
Christa passed away in November 2008, at which time ABI ceased making 
monthly payments to CBI. April contacted the vice president of Rutter, Linda Diamond 
Raznick (Raznick), who informed April that Rutter owned the "library of files" used by 
ABI and that Rutter was not contractually obligated in any way to ABL Clu·ista's will left 
her entire estate to Rammel!. 
ABI filed the instant action against Rammell, CBI and Christa's estate, alleging 
the following eight counts: (1) declaratory relief; (2) fraud; (3) constructive fraud; ( 4) 
breach of contract; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) breach of implied warranty; (7) 
unjust enrichment; and (8) quasi-estoppeL The Defendants counterclaimed, alleging the 
following four counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust emichment; (3) constructive 
trust; and ( 4) violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment, any disputed facts are construed in favor of 
the nomnoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
drawn in favor ofthe nonmoving party. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 
695, 697 (2007). If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary 
judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394,64 P.3d 317,320 
(2003). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 
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508, 513 (2009). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 
225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, 
the nonmoving party must show that there is a triable issue. G & lvf Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). "[A] complete failure of 
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 
39, 42, 28 P.3d 380, 383 (200 I), quoting Celotex Cmp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, I 06 
S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something 
more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
1ssue. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 960,963 (1994). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Motions to Strike. 
In support of Defendants' motion, Defendants filed affidavits of Kenneth 
Rammell and Pete Masterson. Plaintiff has moved to strike portions of the affidavits. 
As to the affidavit of Kem1eth Rammell, the second line of~ 8 will be stricken as 
constituting inadmissible hearsay. The remaining motion to strike is denied. 
As to the affidavit of Pete Masterson, Plaintiffs motion to strike is denied. 
Arguments regarding the content of Masterson's affidavit go to the weight of the 
testimony. 
Defendants have moved to strike portions of the affidavits of April Beguesse on 
the grounds that statements in the affidavit are inconsistent or contrary to deposition 
testimony and therefore "sham" testimony. Said motion is denied with the exception of~ 
lOl 
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27 of the affidavit which is wholly inconsistent with the deposition testimony. 
Defendants also moved to strike , 46 as being conclusory. The Court agrees and said 
paragraph is stricken. 
Defendants have also moved to strike portions of the second affidavit of Linda 
Raznick as being sham testimony. Defendants' motion is denied with the exception of, 
10 which is stricken as being speculative testimony. 
Defendants have also moved to strike portions of the affidavit of Don Mazzella. 
That motion is denied. 
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
1. Declaratory Relief (Count One) 
Defendants move the Comi for summary judgment on each of ABI's claims. 
Count One of the Amended Complaint seeks relief by way of a declaratory judgment 
declaring the Parties' rights or obligations under the alleged contract. 
Defendants argue that ABI' s claim for declaratory relief is barred by the statute of 
limitations. In making the argument, Defendants attempt to apply statutes of limitations 
applicable to contracts. However, a claim for declaratory judgment is not the same as a 
breach of contract action. 
Idaho Code § 10-1201 provides as follows: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have 
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed. [emphasis added] 
The evidence supports an inference that the Parties entered into an ongomg 
contract for the purchase of a business. Declaratory judgment as to the construction of an 
ongoing contract is appropriate. There is no statute of limitations precluding a claim for 
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declaratory judgment as to the alleged contract. Defendants' motion as to Count One is 
denied. 
2. Fraud (Count Two) 
In Count Two of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges fraud or constructive 
fraud as to an alleged ongoing contract with Rutter, that Plaintiff would be the owner of a 
library of files, that Plaintiff would be receiving proprietary software, that Plaintiff would 
be receiving other "intellectual property", that Plaintiff would receive a bequeath of the 
subject business' assets upon the death of Christa Beguesse, and that Defendants did not 
disclose that Rammel! was a part owner of CBI, Inc. 
Defendants attack these claims on a number of grounds. 
a. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants argue that ABI's claims for fraud and constructive fraud are barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
A three-year statute of limitation for fraud is established by I.C. § 5-
218(4). The statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or 
reasonably should have known of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy 
v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991). Application of I.C. § 5-
218( 4) does not depend on when the plaintiff should have been aware that 
something was wrong; as used in the statute, "discovery" means the point 
in time when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
facts constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at 368. 
Actual knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could 
have discovered the fraud by the exercise of due diligence. Nancy Lee 
A1ines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 829 (1973); 
Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 514, 244 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1952); 
Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 435, 871 P.2d 846, 852 
(Ct. App. 1994). The question of when the plaintiff discovered the fraud is 
generally a question for the jury and summary judgment on the issue is 
only appropriate if there is no factual dispute about when this discovery 
occurred. }vfcCoy, 120 Idaho at 774, 820 P.2d at 369. 
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~McCorkle v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554-555, 112 P.3d 838, 
842-843 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Here, the Parties dispute when ABI discovered the alleged fraud. There is a 
reasonable inference that the allege fraud was only discovered within the three years prior 
to the filing of the complaint. Thus, a factual dispute exists and Defendant is not entitled 
to summary judgment by way of a statute of limitations. 
b. Course of Performance 
Defendants argue that "the course of performance indicates that the assets she 
received in January 2004 were the assets for which she bargained." Course of 
performance is relevant only to the extent it addresses one or more of the elements of 
fraud. Any alleged "course of performance" alone does not preclude the fraud allegations. 
Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. 
c. Elements of Fraud 
Defendants argue that ABI can not prove each of the elements of fraud with 
respect to any of the alleged misrepresentations. 
Fraud requires: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; 
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the 
speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the 
falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; 
and (9) resultant injury. Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d 
518, 522 (2002) (citing Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 851, 934 P.2d 20, 
24 (1997)). 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005). 
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. G & A1 Farms 
v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 5 14, 808 P .2d 85 1 (1991 ); Tusch 
Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Bethlahmy v. 
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 
91, 390 P.2d 826 (1964). A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if 
there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
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between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the 
facts from being misleading; or (3) if a fact known by one party and not 
the other is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not 
know it. 
So-wards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). 
i. Library of Files 
ABI alleges that CBI represented that it owned a library of files valued at over 
one million dollars and that ABI would receive these files when it purchased the 
business. Defendants argue that ABI's claim of fraud based on this alleged 
misrepresentation fails because the alleged misrepresentation was not false. ABI contends 
that because Rutter owns the library of files, CBI' s alleged representation was false. 
Defendants rely on the affidavit of Pete Masterson (Masterson) to establish that 
ABI owns the library of files. Masterson testified that, absent an agreement to the 
contrary, trade custom dictates that the typesetter owns the intermediate files used to 
produce the final product for the customer. Masterson concludes that, because ABI and 
Rutter do not have an express agreement altering the trade custom, ABI owns the library 
of files. 
ABI presented the affidavit of Don Mazzella (Mazzella) in opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Mazella' s testimony directly contradicts 
Masterson's testimony. Mazella testified that, absent an agreement to the contrary, trade 
custom dictates that the customer owns the library of files. Raznick confirmed Mazella's 
testimony by stating that Rutter owns the library of files. 
Based on the record before the Court on summary judgment, a genuine question 
of fact exists as to ownership of the library of files. Consequently, a reasonable inference 
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exists that the alleged misrepresentation regarding ownership of the library of files was 
false. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. 
ii. Guaranteed Contract with Rutter 
ABI alleges that CBI represented that Rutter was contractually obligated to do 
business with CBI and that ABI would own the guaranteed contract when it purchased 
the business. Defendants argue that, even if CBI promised a guaranteed contract with 
Rutter, ABI can not prove its ignorance of the falsity of that statement. 
Although the record contains testimony from April that CBI promised to transfer 
a guaranteed contract with Rutter, April's deposition testimony clarifies her 
understanding of the term "contract." 
Q. .. . What I would like to know now is to the best of your memory 
right now what was represented to you about a guaranteed 
contract? How was that described to you? 
A. It was described to me that 
Q. Bywhom? 
A. Christa and Ken both. We were around the kitchen table. That the 
Rutter Group library was owned by Christa Beguesse, 
Incorporated. And because of that there was a binding a 
contractual obligation for the Rutter Group to continue to use 
Christa and vice versa. It would be vastly too much money a11d 
time for them to ever try to reinvent that type of wheel. It was 30 
years in the making. And, again, for the meager fee of $12,000 a 
month I could buy these :files. And then, like I said, turn around 
and sell them either back to the Rutter Group or to a third pmiy. 
Q. That was your guaranteed contract? 
A. I was under the assumption that that was my guaranteed contract, 
yes. 
Q. Am I understanding you conectly that you agree there was not a 
contract and that the Rutter Group - there was a situation where 
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the Rutter Group had no reasonable alternative but to deal with 
your mother and therefore with you? 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE WITNESS: 
I object to the form of the question. 
We used, your verbiage, in the form of 
contract. What you just said we would say 
contract. 
Q. Okay. So is it fair to say, then, that you understood that the Rutter 
Group could, if it wanted to, simply take this business in-house or 
take it to another vendor, but that it would be prohibitively 
expensive for them to do so? 
A. Yes. 
ABI depo., pp. 80-81. See also ABI depo. p. 56, 11. 1 19: 
The foregoing testimony reveals that even if ABI was promised a guaranteed 
contract with Rutter, April understood that no contract existed. April understood that 
Rutter was not required by contract to do business with CBI (or ABI), but only that the 
companies had a good working relationship and that it would be expensive for Rutter to 
take its business elsewhere. ABI knew or should have known that at best, Rutter was, to a 
degree, a captive client. Any testimony from April that uses the term "contract" must be 
considered in light of her understanding of that term. Affidavits of Plaintiff attempting to 
subsequently re-characterize her deposition testimony will not be considered. 
Thus, the record establishes that ABI can not prove its ignorance of the falsity of 
the alleged statement regarding a guaranteed contract with Rutter. Defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment dismissing ABI' s claim for fraud as it relates to this alleged 
misrepresentation. 
iii. Proprietary Sofnvare 
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ABI alleges that CBI represented that CBI owned proprietary software unique to 
the typesetting business and that ABI would receive this software when it purchased the 
business. The only software that ABI received was PageMaker, which can be purchased 
offthe shelfby anyone. 
Defendants argue that ABI simply misunderstood the nature of the software that it 
was receiving and that it can not form the basis for a fraud action. However, at this stage 
in the litigation, an inference exists based on April's testimony that CBI misrepresented 
the software that it owned and used. Whether the software used in the business was 
proprietary or available to the public would reasonably have an effect on the purchase 
price of the business. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this 
basis. 
IV. Other Intellectual Property 
ABI alleges in its complaint that CBI promised to transfer "other intellectual 
property," however, ABI has failed to state what is meant by this phrase (apart from the 
library of files and proprietary software). Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing ABI' s claim for fraud as it relates to this alleged misrepresentation. 
v. Payments Ceasing on Christa's Death 
ABI alleges that Christa promised to make a will bequeathing the business to 
April and that, as a result, payments would cease under the contract when Christa died. 
Defendants argue several theories for why this alleged statement can not serve as a basis 
for fraud, including statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and lack of corroborating 
evidence. However, these theories would only be applicable if ABI was attempting to 
enforce the alleged promise to make a will. Here, ABI is simply alleging fraud. 
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Therefore, the statute of frauds, parol evidence rule and lack of corroborating evidence 
are not relevant or, at best, only relevant as evidence of whether ABI's reliance was 
justified. Nevertheless, an alleged promise to make a will can not be the basis of fraud. 
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in 
nature that relate to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a 
promise or an agreement to do something in the future. Pacific States 
Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927). The 
allegedly false representation must concern past or existing material facts. 
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005). 
We have recognized two exceptions to the general rule that fraud cannot 
be based upon the mere failure to perform a promise. One exception is if 
the speaker made the promise without any intent to keep it, but to induce 
action on the part of the promisee. Pocatello Sec. Trust Co. v. Henry, 35 
Idaho 321,206 P. 175 (1922). The second exception is ifthe promise was 
accompanied by statements of existing fact which show the promisor's 
ability to perform the promise and those statements were false. ld. 
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C, 142 Idaho 671, 673-674, 132 P.3d 428,430-
431 (2006). 
In the case at bar, ABI not only alleges that Christa promised to bequeath the 
business to April, but that Christa's will already spelled out the details. That Christa and 
Rammell allegedly misrepresented existing facts concerning Christa's will implicates the 
second exception to the general rule set forth in Gillespie. Consequently, the Court finds 
that, based on the record, an inference exists that would support ABI's fraud claim as it 
relates to the alleged statement about payments ceasing on Christa's death. 
Defendants also contend that the parol evidence rule and statute of frauds prevent 
ABI from recovering on this portion of its fraud claim. While these theories may be 
relevant if ABI were attempting to enforce the alleged promise to bequeath the business, 
the Court finds that they are not dispositive on the issue of fraud. Gillespie v. Mountain 
Park Estates, L.L.C, 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002) ("[t]he parol evidence 
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rule does not apply to averments of fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake or other 
matters which render a contract void or voidable."); Idaho Falls Bonded Produce and 
Supply Co. v. General A1ills Restaurant Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 50, 665 P .2d 1056, 
1060 (1983) (Bistline, J., concurring) ("[C]ourts will not apply the provisions of the 
Statute of Frauds when to do so would work a fraud."). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that genuine questions of fact exist on 
Plaintiff's claim for fraud as it relates to the alleged statement about payments ceasing on 
Christa's death. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this 
part of Plaintiff's fraud claim. 
vi. Rammell's Ownership Interest 
Defendants' initial motion and argument does not address the claim of fraud by 
nondisclosure of Rammell' s ownership interest in CBI. Accordingly, the Court will not 
address that issue. 
3. Constructive Fraud (Count three) 
Defendants seek a summary dismissal of Count Three of the Amended Complaint 
which is denominated as a claim for "Constructive Fraud". The claim alleges 
constructive fraud based upon a relationship of trust and confidence. However, the claim 
does not set out any factual allegations as to what constituted the alleged fraud. Pursuant 
to Rule 9(b ), IRCP, the facts or circumstances of an alleged fraud must be stated with 
pmiicularity. 
Accordingly, Defendants motion as to Count Three will be granted. This ruling 
does not apply to the allegation in Count Two regarding the alleged nondisclosure of 
Rammell's interest in CBI, which is technically a constructive fraud allegation. 
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4. Breach of Contract (Count Four) 
ABI alleges that CBI breached the Agreement by failing to provide the following 
assets: (1) a library of files worth over one million dollars; (2) a guaranteed contract with 
Rutter; (3) a proprietary software program; and (4) other intellectual property. ABI also 
alleges that CBI breached the contract by failing to provide consulting services after 
Christa died. 
Defendants first argue that the breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations. While a lease agreement might implicate I.C. § 28-12-506, the "Lease 
Agreement" which is an exhibit in this matter bares little resemblance to what the Pmiies 
agree was the contract. Specifically, there was no lease but rather the purchase of a 
business. 1 The subject Lease Agreement was a sham contract for the purpose of avoiding 
tax consequences and neither Party intended there to be a lease. As such, the Lease 
Agreement is unenforceable: "When two parties enter into a sham contract, as between 
themselves, there is no contract and the document is thus unenforceable." 6A A. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts s 1473 (1962); 
The Court finds that the alleged contract in this matter was an oral agreement for 
the purchase of a business. The statute of limitations applicable to an oral agreement is 
four years under I.C. § 28-2-725 or I.C. § 5-217? Under both statutes, the statute of 
limitations begins to run at the time the cause of action accrues. 
a. Guaranteed Contract with Rutter 
As previously set out, the evidence does not support an allegation of a guaranteed 
contract with Rutter. Additionally, such a claim for breach of contract would have 
1 Portions of the written Lease Agreement may be probative of the tenns and conditions of the oral 
agreement 
2 All Parties have referred to UCC provisions and consider the transaction to be subject to the UCC 
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accrued at the time the business was delivered to ABI, which was more than four years 
prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Farmers National Bank v. Wickham Pipeline, 
Construction, 114 Idaho 565, 759 P.2d 71 (1988). 
Plaintiff has argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the 
application of the statute of limitations. 
"The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation defense in Idaho is 
the doctrine of equitable estoppeL" JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Jnt'l, 
Inc., 126 Idaho 532,534,887 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1994). The elements of 
equitable estoppel are as follows: 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel 
did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false 
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied 
upon; and ( 4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or 
from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the 
representation or concealment to his prejudice. 
ld Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of 
limitations. Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d 
813, 815 (2006). It merely bars a party from asserting the statute of 
limitations as a defense for a reasonable time after the party asserting 
estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the truth. Jd 
City ofiv!cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663-664, 201 P.3d 629, 636- 637 (2009). 
The Court finds equitable estoppel to be inapplicable to this issue. As set out 
above, Plaintiff knew of should have known that there was no guaranteed contract with 
Rutter when she took over the business. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 
this claim. 
b. Proprietary Software 
A claim that Plaintiff was not provided proprietary software also arose at the time 
the business was delivered to Plaintiff and would normally be barred by the four year 
statute of limitations. However, there is an inference that Plaintiff did not know that the 
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software was not proprietary until late 2006 when the business performed an update to 
the PageMaker software. As such, equitable estoppel may apply to prevent the 
application of the statute of limitations. Defendants are not entitled to summary 
judgment on this claim. 
c. Intellectual Property 
There is nothing in the record identifying any other intellectual property that was 
to be provided to the Plaintiff as part of the sale of the business. Not only does the 
evidence not support such a claim, the claim would also be barred by the four year statute 
of limitations. 
d. Library Files 
As set out above, there is at least an inference supporting Plaintiff's claim that the 
agreement included library files worth a substantial amount of money. The cause of 
action for this claim did not necessarily accrue at the time of delivery of the business 
inasmuch as that time, there was no adverse claim to the files. Courts have held in similar 
cases that a cause of action for breach accrues at the time the party becomes aware of an 
adverse claim to the property which was purchased under the contract i.e., the alleged 
breach does not occur until an adverse claim is made. 
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for 
limitations purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 
20, 26 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180, 484 P.2d 728, 729 
(1971 ). The five-year statute of limitation for Barraza to bring this breach 
of contract claim began to run when Barraza became aware of the breach. 
The breach alleged in Ban·aza's answer occurred when Cuevas filed the 
instant quiet title action-April 2, 2007. 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740,746 (Idaho App.,2008) 
The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claim accrues upon 
the breach of the contract. Prewett v. First Nat'! Bank of Hagerman, 45 
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Idaho 451,457,262 P. 1057, 1058 (1928). The question ofwhen the 
breach occurred is a factual one. Therefore, we look to the record to see if 
there is sufficient and competent evidence to support the findings. lvfays v. 
Kast, 96 Idaho 472,531 P.2d 234 (1975). The evidence ofthe discovery of 
the logging and the listing of the property for sale is ce1iainly a point at 
which the Spences were aware their development was not going forward. 
Taking the evidence outlined above in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there was substantial evidence to present the issue to the 
jury and trom which the jury could find that the Spences' agreement with 
Howell was not breached until 1988. 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,770-771,890 P.2d 714,721 -722 (1995). 
In this case, there is evidence that an adverse claim to the files arose within the 
four years prior to the filing of the complaint. Additionally, based upon the disputed 
evidence equitable estoppel may preclude the application of the statute of limitations to 
this claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim is 
denied. 
e. Consulting Services 
The Parties agreement regarding consulting services from Christa was an 
agreement for future performance, and no breach arises until the time for performance is 
to occur. Plaintiff argues that the agreement was breached inasmuch as Christa can not 
provide consulting services due to her death. 
The death of Christa constitutes and "impossibility" and can not be the basis for a 
breach of contract claim. 
The common law doctrine of impossibility of performance operates to 
excuse a party from liability for nonperformance of his or her obligations 
under a contract. See Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 130 Idaho 105, 108, 
937 P.2d 417, 420 (1997); Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 121 Idaho 463, 
465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992); State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523, 
198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct.App.2008); Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 
190, 193, 953 P.2d 630, 633 (Ct.App.1998). Impossibility is proven by 
showing that a contingency occurred, the nonoccurrence of which was a 
basic assumption of the agreement and that the contingency made 
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performance of the contract impossible. Kessler, 130 Idaho at 108, 937 
P.2d at 420; Haessly, 121 Idaho at 465, 825 P.2d at 1121; Chacon, 146 
Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752. 
State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 1980405, 5 (Idaho App.,20 1 0). 
In addition to the foregoing, there is no evidence that Defendants failed to provide 
substitute consulting services upon request of Plaintiff. While Defendants may have an 
obligation to provide such substitute services, absent a request and failure to provide such 
services, there is no basis to asse1i a breach. The Court does not accept Plaintiffs 
argument that no other person could provide adequate consulting as may be required by 
Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 
5. Breach of Express Warranty (Count Five) and Implied Warranty (Count Six) 
In Count Five and Six of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the 
Defendants warranted that the transfer of assets included a library of proprietary files 
worth over one million dollars, a guaranteed contract with Rutter, proprietary software 
program, and other intellectual property. These warranty claims are subject to the same 
analysis as set out above. Warranty claims are further subject to the same four year 
statute of limitations. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 824, 979 P.2d 1174, 
1182 (1999). 
Again, a warranty claim as to a guaranteed contract is not supported by the 
evidence and barred by the statute of limitations. Disputed issues of fact preclude 
summary judgment as to the alleged proprietary software. The evidence does not support 
a claim as to "other intellectual property" and in any event, such a claim is baned by the 
four year statute of limitations. The claim as to a library of proprietary files is not as a 
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matter of law barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, disputed issues of fact 
preclude summary judgment on that claim. 
Accordingly, as to Counts Five and Six, Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment in part. 
6. Unjust Enrichment (Count Seven) 
Plaintiff argues that it would be unjust for Defendants to retain the payments 
made for the purchase of the business in that Plaintiff did not receive what she was 
"promised". Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that may be available to a party 
when there is no adequate remedy at law. 
Unjust emichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which 
would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the 
extent that retention is unjust. Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 
118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990) (quoting Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 
Idaho 456, 457, 567 P.2d 1, 2 (1977)). A prima facie case of unjust 
enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of 
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). 
The doctrine of unjust emichment is not permissible where there is an 
enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same 
subject matter. Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152, 30 P.3d 300, 307 
(Ct. App. 2001) (citing DBSI/TRI v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 805, 948 P.2d 
151, 160 (1997)). Equity does not intervene when an express contract 
prescribes the right to compensation. Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. 
Co., 116 Idaho 460, 464, 776 P.2d 469, 473 (Ct. App. 1989); see Wolford 
v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064,695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984). 
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558, 165 P.3d 261, 272 (2007). 
Defendants argue that the claim of unjust enrichment is simply a different theory 
for the same relief sought in the foregoing actions at law. As referenced above, equitable 
remedies are not available when a party has an adequate remedy at law. 
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As apparent from the pleadings, legal claims available to Plaintiff included fraud, 
breach of contract and breach of warranty. If failure to provide proprietary files, etc. 
constitutes a breach of contract, then the trier of fact can ascertain the damages arising 
from that breach. Even if an adequate remedy at law becomes barred by a statute of 
limitations, an equitable claim of unjust emiclm1ent will not apply. Thomas v. Campbell, 
107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wickham Pipeline 
Canst., 114 Idaho 565,759 P.2d 71 (1988). Rather, as long as an adequate remedy at law 
existed at some point, an equitable claim will be precluded. 
There being adequate remedies at law, unjust emichment is not available as an 
alternate theory for the same relief. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this 
claim. 
7. Quaisi-Estoppel (Count Eight). 
ABI alleges that Defendants should be estopped "from taking a position contrary 
to their previous position that payments would cease upon Christa's death." Pl.'s Memo. 
in Opp. to Mot. for S.J., p. 38. Defendants argue that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does 
not apply in this case. 
To prevail on a quasi-estoppel theory, the claimant must show: 
(1) the offending pmiy took a different position than his or her 
original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other 
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a 
benefit or acquiesced in. 
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 235 P.3d 387, 393 (2010) (quoting Terrazas v. 
Blaine County, 147ldaho 193, 200 n. 3, 207 P. 3d 169, 176 n. 3 (2009)). 
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As an equitable remedy, quasi-estoppel is not available when there is an adequate 
remedy at law. As set out above, Plaintiff is pursuing a fraud claim based on the 
allegation that Defendants represented that an existing will provided that payments would 
end upon Christa's death. Since a legal remedy is available on this claim, Plaintiff may 
not pursue an equitable claim for quasi estoppel. 
8. Defendants' Counterclaims 
Defendants also seek summary judgment on their counterclaims seeking relief for 
breach of contract, constructive trust, and injunctive relief. Defendants' argument is 
primarily based on the claim that Plaintiff has breached the contract by failing to pay 
$12,000 a month pursuant to the agreement. 
While the evidence establishes that Plaintiff has stopped making the monthly 
payment, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the non-payment is a breach of 
contract. If Plaintiff is successful on the fraud claim, the contract may be considered void 
and there would be no breach. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims may be the basis of a 
setoff for any recovery of Defendants.3 Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to 
summary judgment on the unjust enrichment or constructive trust claims based on the 
disputed issues of fact. 
Defendants also seek injunctive relief as to Plaintiff disclosing trade secrets and 
proprietary information to its customers or other third parties. Under the circumstances of 
the litigation, Defendants have a legitimate interest in preserving such trade secrets. The 
Court finds that such injunctive relief is proper during the course of the litigation and all 
3 A statute of limitations will not preclude a claim or defense for purposes of a setoff. Even though 
affirmative relief on a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be presented defensively as a 
setoff against an adverse claim. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685,687-688,23 P.3d 147, 149-50 (2001); 
Hirning v. Webb, 91 Idaho 229,231,419 P.2d 671,673 (1966); Kelson v. Ahlborn, 87 Idaho 519,528,393 
P.2d 578, 583 (1964 ); Viehweg v. Thompson, l 03 Idaho 265, 268, 647 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct.App.1982). 
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Parties are enjoined from disclosing to third parties trade secrets or proprietary 
information ofthe subject business. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Parties motions to strike are granted in part and 
denied in part. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in pmi and denied 
in part, as set out above. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 2_ day ofNovember, 2010. 
\ 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
We, the jury, answer the interrogatories in the Verdict Form as follows: 
FRAUD 
Question No. 1: Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud, constructive fraud, or 
fraud by nondisclosure? 
Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 2: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud, constructive fraud, or 
fraud by nondisclosure? 
Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form Page 1 
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Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 3: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell commit fraud, 
constructive fraud, or fraud by nondisclosure? 
Answer: Yes No 
Ifyou answered "Yes" to questions 1, 2, or 3, answer Question No.4. Ifyou 
answered "No" to questions 1, 2, and 3, proceed to Question No. 5. 
Question No.4: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 
caused by the fraud, constructive fraud, or fraud by nondisclosure? 
Answer: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No.5: Did Kenneth Rammell breach a contract with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 6: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach a contract with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 7: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Ran1111ell breach a contract 
with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 5, 6, or 7, please answer Question No. 8. If 
you answered "No" to questions 5, 6, or 7, then please proceed to Question No. 9. 
Question No.8: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 
caused by the breaches of contract? 
Answer: 
Plaintiff's Proposed Special Verdict Form Page 2 
122 
BREACH OF WARRANTY 
Question No. 9: Did Kenneth Rammell breach an express or implied warranty 
with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 10: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach an express or implied 
warranty with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
Question No. 11: Did The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell breach an express 
or implied warranty with the Plaintiff? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to questions 9, 10, or 11, then please answer Question No. 
12. If you answered "No" to questions 9, 10, and 11, then please proceed to Question 
No. 13. 
Question No. 12: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 
caused by the breaches of express or implied warranties? 
Answer: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No. 13: Did the Plaintiff breach a contract with the Defendants? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you "Yes" to Question No. 13, then please answer Question No. 14. If you 
answered "No" to Question No. 13, then please proceed to Question No. 15. 
Question No. 14: What is the total amount of damages to Defendants proximately 
caused by the breaches of contract by the Plaintiff? 
Answer: 
Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form Page 3 
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TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Question No. 15: Did the Defendants have a trade secret? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 15, please proceed to Question No. 16. If 
you answered "No" then you are done. Please sign the verdict and inform the bailiff. 
Question No. 16: Did the Plaintiffmisappropriate the Defendants' trade secrets in 
a wrongful manner? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 16, please proceed to Question No. 17. If 
you answered "No" to Question No. 16 then you are done. Please sign the verdict and 
inform the bailiff. 
Question No. 17: Did the Plaintiff's misappropriation ofthe Defendants' trade 
secrets proximately harm the Defendants? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 17, please proceed to Question No. 18. If 
you answered "No" to Question No. 17 then you are done. Please sign the verdict and 
inform the bailiff. 
Question No. 18: What is the total amount of damages caused to the Defendants 
by the Plaintiffs misappropriation of the Defendants' trade secrets? 
Answer: 
Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Farm Page 4 
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DATED: January __ , 2011 
Jury Foreperson 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Jeffrey D. 
Brunson and the law firm, Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A, and submits the following 
proposed jury instructions. 
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IDJI 1.20.1 Burden of proof- preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or 
use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be 
persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given / Refused Modified Covered Other 126 -- --
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
One of the named defendants in this case is The Estate of Christa Beguesse 
Rammell. Statements made by Christa Beguesse Rammell are attributable to 
The Estate of Christa Begue sse Rammell for purposes of this trial. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 127 
IDJI 1.20.2- Burden of proof- clear and convincing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
W'hen I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear 
and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly 
probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the 
general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given --
/ 
Refused Modified Covered Other 
128 
IDJI 1.22 - Deposition testimony (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A 
deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in 
writing. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give 
had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is 
a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be 
available to you during yom deliberations. 
Comment: 
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given / Refused Modified Covered Other 
12f~ 
IDJI 1.24.1 Circumstantial evidence without definition 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no 
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a 
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force 
as it may cany. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given I Refused Modified Covered Other ---
130 
IDJI 1.28 Evidence admitted for limited purpose 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your 
attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence 
was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose 
other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given J Refused Modified Covered Other --
131 
IDJI 4.60- Fraud - issues 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement was 
made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
elements of traud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
132 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should 
be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08 .5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. 
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones, Ill Idao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 
Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Fawv. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given 
--'<---
Refused Modified Covered Other 
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IDJI 6.0 1.1 -Elements of contract- introductory (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO.8 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do 
something that is supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have 
these four elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that this instruction be used only where the 
jury actually needs a "lecture on contracts" The detailed instruction should usually 
be unnecessary, as only specific issues in dispute need be covered. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other --- --
134 
IDJI 6.05.2- Material tem1s- offer and acceptance (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
A contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted by 
another party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the 
party making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the pmiy to whom the 
offer was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the 
offer. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other -- --
13~) 
IDJI 6.06.1 -Contract may be written or oral 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written tenns 
and oral tem1s. So long as all the required elements are present, it makes no 
difference whether the agreement is in writing. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
/ 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- 13G 
IDJI 6.06.5- Oral contracts are binding 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
An oral agreement that contains all of the elements of a contract is a 
binding contract. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given -- Refused Modified -- Covered Other 137 
IDJI 6.08.1 Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties (Modified) 
Note: The court must first decide whether detem1ination of the intent of the parties is 
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should 
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may 
be appropriate: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The tenus of the contract are in dispute as to the following 
prOVISIOns: 
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with a library 
of files worth over one million dollars; 
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with 
proprietary software owned by CBI; 
• Whether the defendants agreed that payments by ABI would 
cease upon the death of Christa Beguesse. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the 
contract in this case. In making this determination you should consider, 
from the evidence, the following: 
1. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the 
contracting parties showing what they intended and how they construed the 
doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with 
the remainder of the terms. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given -- Refused -- Modified Covered Other 138 
IDJI 6.08.4- Interpretation of contract- definition of material fact 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 13 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the 
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been made. 
Comments: 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
/ 
Given Refused J Modified Covered Other --
139 
IDJI 6.08.5- Interpretation of contract- materiality 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 14 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation m 
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a 
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence 
in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the 
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is 
likely to regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, 
whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement 
(Second) ofTorts, Sections 538(2).) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused -- Modified __;:__ Covered Other 140 
IDJI 6.09.1 -Amendments to contracts 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the 
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given J Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- "--- 141 
IDJI 6.1 0.1 -Breach of bilateral contract- general case- no affirmative defenses 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 16 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, and 
explained in the next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified j Covered Other -- --
142 
IDJI 6.11 -Material breach 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
Comments: 
Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695,699 (1993) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other 
143 
IDJI 6.27.1- Fraud (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
To establish the defense of fi"aud, ABI has the burden proving by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. The defendants made a representation of a past or present fact; 
2. The representation was false; 
3. The represented fact was important; 
4. The defendants knew the representation was false (or acted with a 
reckless disregard of the truth of the representation); 
5. ABI was not aware of the falsity of the representation; 
6. The defendants intended that ABI rely upon the representation in 
agreeing to enter into the contract; 
7. ABI did rely upon the representation; 
8. ABI's reliance was justified. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should 
be for ABL 
Comment: 
Materiality is defined in Instruction 6.08.5 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---
144 
IDJI 6.27 .3 -Defense of non-disclosure (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
A party is not obligated to perform a contract if that party establishes 
the defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of non-disclosure, 
ABI has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
1. The defendants were aware of a fact vital to the essence of 
the contract; 
2. ABI was unaware of the fact, and could not reasonably learn 
of it; 
3. The defendants knew that ABI was unaware of the true fact 
and knew that disclosure of the true fact would correct a basic assumption 
upon which ABI was making the contract; 
4. The defendants did not disclose the fact to ABI, intending 
that ABI would act in ignorance of the fact; 
5. The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to act 
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing; 
[and] 
6. ABI entered into the contract upon the reasonable assumption 
that the non-disclosed fact did not exist. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should 
be for ABI. 
145 
Comment: 
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be 
superior to the previous IDJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161; 
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964). 
The subject of duty to speak was tangentially addressed in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 
91 Idaho 55, and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, with references to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551. The committee feels the above instruction is 
consistent with those cases and the tort restatement, although cast in light of the 
Restatement of Contracts provisions. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other 
146 
IDJI 9.00 Cautionary instruction on damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not 
express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given / Refused Modified Covered Other --
147 
IDJI 9.03- Damages for breach of contract general fonnat (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
defendant, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonable 
and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following elements of 
damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's 
conduct: 
• The amounts paid by ABI to the defendants until the date of 
Christa Beguesse's death; 
• The difference between the real value of the property 
purchased and that value which it would have had the 
representations been true. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified / Covered Other --
143 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
Fraud may be established by silence when a defendant had a duty to speak. 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused // Modified Covered Other 
149 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
A duty to speak "arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal terms 
or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party." 
G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other 
150 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
Fraud may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n v. Hautzinger, 137 Idaho 401, 404, 49 P.3d 206, 409 (2002). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given -- Covered / Other Refused Modified 151 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
A party is under a duty to disclose if a fact known by one party and not the other 
is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party 
knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it. 
Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P .3d 1245 (Idaho 2000). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused /Modified Covered Other 
IDJI 2.30.2- Proximate cause "substantial factor," without "but for" test (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage 
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the irDury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred 
anyway. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given / Refused Modified Covered -- Other 15J 
IDJI 9.13- Present cash value 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that 
may accrue in the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid 
now which, when invested at a reasonable rate of interest, would be 
sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future 
damages will be incurred. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other 154 ---
IDJI 9.14- Mitigation of damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results 
from a failure to exercise such care cmmot be recovered. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused / Modified Covered Other --- -- ---
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
When considering a claim for constructive fraud, there is no need for the plaintiff 
to have proved the defendants' intent, i.e., knowledge of falsity or intent to induce 
reliance, since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the breach." 
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. Afyron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288,294 (2006). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
15G 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would 
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate 
damages of a different amount 
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
When a buyer has goods that do not conform to express or implied warranties, the 
buyer keeps the goods and sues for the difference in the value of the goods as received 
and the value of the goods as warranted plus, in a proper case, any incidental damages 
and consequential damages. 
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 153 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
ABI asserts that the defendants warTanted that CBI could transfer to ABI certain 
assets including a library of proprietary files valued at over one million dollars and a 
proprietary software program unique to CBI's business. 
A warranty is defined as a promise that something in furtherance of the contract is 
guaranteed by one of the contracting parties. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7th Ed. 1581 (1999) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
In every contract for sale there is a warranty of title that the title of the goods is 
good and the transfer rightfuL 
Idaho Code § 28-2-312. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
160 
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
Any affirmation of fact or promise made by a seller to a buyer, which relates to 
the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 
the goods shall confonn to the affirmation or promise. 
Idaho Code § 28-2-313. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
161 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 28-2-313. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
162 
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
There is a warranty that no other person holds a claim to or interest in the goods 
as a matter of law. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 28-12-211 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
163 
INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
Warranties may be express or implied. 
An express warranty is a warranty created by words or actions of the seller. 
Express warranties may be created by affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller 
to the buyer relating to the goods that becomes the basis of the bargain; (2) a description 
of the goods that becomes part of the basis of the bargain; or (3) a sample or model made 
part of the basis of the bargain. 
An implied warranty arises because of the circumstances of the sale rather than a 
seller's express promise. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-313; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 164 
INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants expressly 
warranted that they were transferring a library of proprietary files valued over one million 
dollars and/or a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business to ABI, then your 
verdict should be for ABI. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given -- Refused Modified Covered Other 165 
INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants did not have 
title to a library of proprietary files valued over one million dollars and/or a proprietary 
software program unique to CBI's business, then your verdict should be for ABI. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
166 
INSTRUCTION NO. 40 
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets to be 
transferred would be merchantable. This implied warranty means that the property is tit 
for the ordinary purpose for which it is used and that it would conform to the promises or 
affirmations of fact made by the defendants. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly 
warranted that the library of files and the proprietary software were warranted for a as 
merchantable, then your verdict should be for ABI. 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 167 
INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets were fit for a 
particular purpose. An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose means that if a 
seller has reason to know of the buyer's special purpose for the property, that the property 
is suitable for those purposes. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly 
warranted that the library offlles and the propriet(try software were warranted for a 
particular purpose, then your verdict should be for ABI. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-315; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
163 
INSTRUCTION NO. 42 
The term "consequential damages" is defined as losses that do not flow directly 
and immediately from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act. 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 394 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified -- Covered -- Other 169 
INSTRUCTION NO. 43 
The term "incidental damages" is defined as "losses reasonably associated with or 
related to actual damages." 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 395 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
170 
INSTRUCTION NO. 44 
In order to prevail in a misappropriation action under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, 
the defendants must show that a trade secret actually existed. Without a proven trade 
secret there can be no misappropriation even if ABI' s action was wrongful. 
Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- 171 
INSTRUCTION NO. 45 
Information is only a trade secret if it derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure and 
use; and is the subject of effects that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy. 
Idaho Code Ann. §_48-801(5)(a)~(b). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- 172 
INSTRUCTION NO. 46 
One factor that may be considered when deciding if information constitutes a 
trade secret is "the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others." 
RESTATEMENT (TORTS)§ 757 cmtb (1939); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 
726, 735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
173 
INSTRUCTION NO. 47 
"Misappropriation" means: 
(a) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (b) Disclosure or use of a 
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who: 
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge 
ofthe trade secret was: 
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire 
it; 
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use; or 
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking 
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(C) Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was 
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
Idaho Code§ 48-801 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
INSTRUCTION NO. 48 
In this case, the defendants have asse1ied that ABI misappropriated its trade 
secrets by improper means and that such misappropriation has damaged the defendants. 
In order to enter a verdict for the defendants, the defendants must demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that ABI misappropriated trade secrets by improper means. If 
the defendants do not meet their burden, then your verdict must be for ABL 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered -- Other 175 
INSTRUCTION NO. 49 
The term "improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or 
other means. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 48-801(1). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN ANTI FOR THE COuNTY OF BONNEVILLE 











Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its ) 




COMES NOW, THE Defendants, by and through counsel, and respectfully submit the 
following proposed Jury Instructions No. 1 through 40 and Special Verdict Form. This Defendant 
reserves the right to submit additional instructions at trial based upon issues that may arise during the 
course of the trial or after review of Plaintiffs proposed jury instructions. 
DATED this~ day of January, 2011. 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 177 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~1hay ofJanuary, 2011, I served a true, correct and copy 
ofthe above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
/ 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
[] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
N Facsimile (?,08) 529-97 32 . . . 
{?Hi /:!#tcul io 5haum'e~ btZa,rcldc It< 1f'rLciY( 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _(_ 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc., (ABI) is an Idaho corporation fully owned by April 
Beguesse. Defendant Clnista Beguesse, Inc., (CBI) is an Idaho corporation whose shares are 
owned by Defendants Ke1meth J. Rann11ell and the Estate of Christa Beguesse-Rammell. 
Christa Rammell and Kenneth Rammell were married in Califomia in 1988, and they 
remained manied until her death in November 2008. Cluista was the mother from a previous 
marriage of April Beguesse. Kenneth Rammell was Clnista's sole heir under a Last \Vill and 
Testament she wrote in September 2007. 
Until January 2004, CBI operated a typesetting business located in Idaho Falls. Clu·ista 
Beguesse started a typesetting business in Califomia in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, she began 
typesetting law books for a California publisher called The Rutter Group. By the mid-1990s, The 
Rutter Group represented most ofClnista's business. In 1995, Cluista Rammell fom1ed CBI as a 
California corporation. In 1996, she dissolved the Califomia corporation, moved to Idaho Falls 
with Ke1meth Rammell, and fon11ed the Idaho corporation, Clnista Beguesse, Inc., which is a 
party to this case. 
After the move to Idaho, CBI retained only one customer, The Rutter Group. CBI had no 
contract or binding agreement requiring The Rutter Group to use CBI's typesetting services. CBI 
continued to operate the typesetting business until it sold the business to April Beguesse, Inc. in 
January 2004. 
In November 2001, Ken and Christa Rammell proposed to April Beguesse that she move 
to Idaho Falls and go to work for CBI in order to leam the business so she could take it over. 
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April did so and began working for CBI in January 2002. Cbxista taught April the operation of 
the business and made sure that the customer approved of the planned change in ownership. 
April Beguesse was aware that The Rutter Group was not obligated by contract to use her 
services, and could take its typesetting business to another provider at any time. By this time, The 
Rutter Group was owned by West Publishing, a division of Thomson Reuters Corporation, one of 
the largest publishing companies in the world. 
In January 2004, the business began operating in the same location and with the same 
equipment, assets and employees under the ownership of ABI. Under the agreement entered into 
between ABI and CBI, ABI was to pay to CBI the sum of$12,000.00 per month for eight years, 
and Christa Beguesse was to be available to ABI for consulting as needed. 
ABI made those payments for four years and 10 months until Clnista's death in November 
2008. From January 2004 through December 2008, ABI had revenues from its one customer, The 
Rutter Group, of $1 ,929,068.00. During that same time, out of those revenues, ABI made 
payments to CBI pursuant to the agreement in the amount of$684,520.00. Also during that time, 
ABI paid salary, benefits and profits to April Beguesse in the amount of at least $489,262.00. 
ABI is still operating the typesetting business and doing work for The Rutter Group. It has 
lost none of the work it was doing for The Rutter Group before Cluista's death, and has obtained 
new business since Clnista's death. ABI has incuned no monetary damages as a result of the 
fraud, breach of contract and breach of wananty alleged in this case. 




MODIFIED: __ _ 
COVERED: __ _ 
OTHER: ___ _ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. V 
The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced 
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with 
the same impmiiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 








INSTRUCTION NO. L 
Ce1iain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable. If such a contract exists but is not in 
writing, this does not mean that there is no contract, or that it is illegal or improper, it simply means 
that the contract may not be enforced in court. 








When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you 
find'' or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably tme 








INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
On plaintiff's claim of constructive fraud against the defendants, the plamtiff has the 
burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That there existed between the plaintiff and the defendants such a relationship of 
trust and confidence that it created in the defendants an obligation not to exert influence or 
pressure on the plaintiff, or take selfish advantage of the plaintiff's trust, or deal with the subject 
matter of the trust in such a way as to benefit themselves or prejudice the plaintiff except in the 
utmost good faith and with the full knowledge and consent ofthe plaintiff; 
2. That the defendants stated a fact to the plaintiff, or failed to disclose to the plaintiff 
a fact known to them; 
3. The statement was false, or the failure to disclose the fact left the plaintiff with 
incomplete or incorrect knowledge; 
4. The statement or fact was material; 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the fact was false, or that his knowledge was 
incomplete or incorrect; 
6. The plaintiff relied upon the truth of the statement, or upon its incomplete or 
incorrect knowledge; 
7. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
8. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
9. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the defendants commit constructive fraud? 
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of constructive 
fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the 
foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict 
should be for the defendant 
IDJI 1.41.2 Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
18G 
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INSTRUCTION NO. lQ 
On plaintiff's claim of fraud against the defendants, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3 The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent ofthe damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the defendants commit fraud? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have 
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the defendant. 
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A charging instruction 
such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of action covered by a special 
interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence may be modified as necessary to 
specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which is covered by the charging instruction and 
the special verdict interrogatory to which it relates. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _____,__ 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing evidence, 
I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher 
burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 








INSTRUCTION NO <6 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantiaL The law makes no distinction between direct 
and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected 
for such convincing force as it may carry. 








On the issue of fraud, the Plaintiff, April Beguesse Inc., has the burden of proof on each of 
the following propositions by clear and convmcing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it in 
a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent ofthe damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been 
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not 
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing 
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the Plaintiff If you find that any of the 
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
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INSTRUCTION NO _ _,__,__,__ 
On the defendants' counterclaim claim of breach of contract against Plaintiff, the defendants 
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The plaintiff ABI breached the contract; 
3. The defendants have been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount ofthe damages. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did ABI breach a contract with any of the defendants? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
IDJI 1.41.3 Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any 
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special 
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be isolated into 
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer 





INSTRUCTION NO. \l 
On the defendants' claim of implied contract or unjust enrichment against Plaintiff 
The doctrine of m~ust enrichment states that in the absence of circumstances indicating 
otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests another to transfer prope11y to him thereby 
bargains to pay for it. 
The measure of recovery for services furnished or goods received under the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment is the value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the plaintiff 
The defendant has the burden of proving the elements of unjust enrichment as follows 
I. That the plaintiff requested the defendant to transfer property to her; 
2. That given all the circumstances existing at that time, it appears that the plaintiff agreed 
to pay for that property; and 
3. The value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the plaintiff. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Should the defendants recover from the plaintiff on their claim of unjust enrichment or 
implied contract? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
IDIT 1.41.3 -Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories 
Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434 (App. 2002) 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any 
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special 
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be Isolated into 
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer 









On defendants' counterclaim for misappropriation of trade secrets against the plaintiff, the 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That the defendants possessed trade secrets; 
2. That the plaintiff used theft, bribery, or misrepresentation to acquire knowledge of 
the defendants' trade secrets; 
3. That the plaintiff disclosed or used the defendants' trade secrets without the 
express or implied consent ofthe defendants; and 
4. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the plaintiff ABI misappropriate trade secrets belonging to one or more of the 
defendants? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
aU of the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
IDJI 1. 41.2 Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories, revised 
Comment: 
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A charging instruction 
such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of action covered by a special 
interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence may be modified as necessary to 
specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which is covered by the charging instruction and 







INSTRUCTION NO. \) 
On the plaintiff's claim of breach of contract against the defendants, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions 
A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendants breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount ofthe damages 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
IDJI 1.41.3 Charging instructions on defense claims - special interrogatories 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any 
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special 
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be Isolated into 
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer 






INSTRUCTION NO 4 
On the plaintiffs claim ofbreach of express warranty with regard to the so-called proprietary 
software, the plaintiffhas the burden of proof on each ofthe followmg propositions: 
1. The defendants expressly warranted the existence of propnetary software unique to CBI 
and authored by Christa Beguesse from scratch; 
2. The defendants breached the warranty; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount ofthe damages. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the defendants breach an express warranty with ABI relating to the proprietary 
software? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
IDJI 1.41.3 Charging instructions on defense claims- special interrogatories 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that when there are affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and in any 
case involving multiple claims, cross claims or third party claims, verdicts on special 
interrogatories be used. Then, each party's claim, counterclaim or cross claim can be isolated into 
a charging instruction which defines that claim, and sets forth the elements necessary to answer 








The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following provisions· 
Whether the parties agreed that the assets of the business to be transferred from Christa 
Beguesse, Inc. to April Beguesse, Inc., included ( 1) the copyrights in the library of publications which 
the business typeset for its customer, and (2) a proprietary computer program, written by Christa 
Beguesse, that allowed the Adobe PageMaker program to read files created by Microsoft \Vord. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this 
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
I. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances 
giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing 
what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided 
that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the 
remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any 
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the 
evidence that this was not intended. 






INSTRUCTION NO. H0 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any witness, 
or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is 
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement While you may consider the 
testimony ofwitnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to 
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no 
longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts. 







INSTRUCTION NO. \l 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the consideration of the contract, or 
without which it would not have been made. 
IDJI 6.08.4- Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact 
Comments: 













INSTRUCTION NO. \c{ 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the party's course 
of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the 
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to regard the 
matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would 
so consider. 
IDJI 6.08.5- Interpretation of contract- materiality 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement (Second) of 




A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this case: 
The parties are competent to enter into a contract, and the alleged contract was for a lawful purpose. 
IDJI 6.01. 1- Elements of contract- introductory 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that this instruction be used only where the jury actually needs 
a "lecture on contracts" The detailed instruction should usually be unnecessary, as only specific issues 








In this case, April Beguesse, Inc. alleges that there was no consideration to support the 
existence of a contract. 
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of value was given or was agreed 
to be given in exchange for it. In law, the giving of value or agreement to give value is called 
"consideration'' Consideration is the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in exchange 
for the other party's performance or promise to perform. 
Consideration must have value; if it has no value at all, it is not sufficient. If the parties have 
agreed upon the specific consideration to be given in this case, then any value, however slight, is 
sufficient. 








In this case, April Beguesse, Inc. alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential terms of 
the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds," and means that 
all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract 
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all parties, 
understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties. 








A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So long 
as all the required elements are present, it makes no difference whether the agreement is in writing. 








Certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable If such a contract exists but is not in 
writing, this does not mean that there is no contract, or that it is illegal or improper, it simply means 
that the contract may not be enforced in court. 








An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has authorized another, called 
the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. 
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be expressed or implied. [A 
business purpose is not required.] [Compensation ofthe agent is not required.] [The term "principal" 
includes employers, and the term "agent" includes employees.] 
IDJI 6.40.5- Agency defined 
Comments: 
Note: Use bracketed portions applicable to case. See, Thornton v. Budge, 257 P 2d 238, 240, 









In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claim offraud The 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
The Defendant has asserted that the clmm of fraud is barred by the statute oflimitations. The 
statute oflimitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiffknew or reasonably should have known 
of the facts constituting the fraud. You can infer that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts 
constituting the fraud at the time that the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of 
due diligence. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known of the facts constituting the fraud on or before May 7, 2006, then your verdict 
should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
propositions have not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this 
case. 
IDJI 6.1 0.4 - General contract- affirmative defenses 







INSTRUCTION NO. 1.J[) 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach that 
defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract. 
IDJI 6.11 -Material breach 
Comments: 







INSTRUCTION NO. 2'] 
When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" the contract or that "substantial 
performance" of the contract is required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for 
by the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract may be substantially 
performed even though there may have been some deviations or omissions from the performance 
called for by the precise language of the contract. 







DEFEND~l\JTS RESERVE THE RJGHT TO SlJBMIT AN APPROPRJATE INSTRUCTION ON 
IMPOSSIBILITY IF THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIES IT 
INSTRUCTION NO 
In this case, the defendant has claimed the defense of impossibility because ofthe following 
circumstance: 
[Insei1 description of circumstance, such as death of essential participant, destruction of 
essential property, unforeseen change of law, act of God, etc. ] 
In order for this defense to apply, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following: 
1. The circumstance alleged by the defendant exists or existed through no fault of the 
defendant. 
2. The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably have been anticipated by the 
defendant when the contract was entered into. 
3. The happening of this circumstance was not assigned or assumed as the responsibility 
of any party by the contract itself 
4. The happening ofthis circumstance prevents the performance ofthe contract in its 
essential and important terms. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing 
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the 
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff 









INSTRUCTION NO. ·1-i 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative 
defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. 








In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claim of breach of 
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
The Defendant has asserted that the claim of breach of contract arising from the ownership 
ofthe PageMaker-format files is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for 
breach of contract begins to run when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a third 
party was making an adverse claim to ownership of the property. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known that a third party was making an adverse claim to ownership of the PageMaker-
format files on or before May 7, 2005, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you find from 
your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have not been proved, then the 
defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
IDJI 6.1 0.4- General contract- affirmative defenses 









In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claims of breach of 
contract and breach of warranty. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative 
defenses asserted. 
In this case, the Court has found that the claims ofbreach of contract and breach of warranty 
arising from the proprietary software claim is barred by the statute oflimitations unless the plaintiff 
proves that an exception to the statute of limitations applies. To prove the exception, the plaintiff 
must prove each of the following elements : 
( 1) That defendants made a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual 
or constructive knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the plaintiff did not know or could not discover the truth; 
(3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied on; 
and 
( 4) that the plaintiff relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice, 
with the result that the plaintiff was unable to determine that the software was not proprietary before 
May 7, 2005. 
If you found in favor of the plaintiff on its claims of either breach of contract or breach of 
warranty arising from the proprietary software issue, you must consider whether the plaintiff has 
proven the four elements above. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
plaintiff has proven each of these four elements, then your verdict on the claim for breach of contract 
arising from the proprietary software issue should be for the plaintiff If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have not been proved, then your 
verdict should be for the defendant 
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ID JI 6.1 0. 4 - General contract - affirmative defenses (revised) 







INSTRUCTION NO. :z,_. 
In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claims of fraud, 
breach of contract and breach of warranty. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the 
affirmative defenses asserted. 
The Defendant has asserted that the claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. "Laches" 
means the neglect to assert a right or a claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other 
circumstances, causes prejudice to the other party, such that it would be unfair to permit the plaintiff 
to bring the claim at this time. statute oflimitations. The statute oflimitations for fraud begins to run 
when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts constituting the fraud. You can 
infer that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud at the time that the 
plaintiff could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of due diligence. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known of the facts constituting the fraud on or before May 7, 2006, then your verdict 
should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
propositions have not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this 
case. 
IDJI 6.1 0.4 - General contract- affirmative defenses 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979) 







By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 








If the JUry decides the defendants are entitled to recover from the plaintiff on their 
counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury must determine the amount of money that will 
reasonable and fairly compensate the defendant for any of the following elements of damages proved 
by the evidence to have resulted from the plaintiffs breach of contract· 
The total amount of payments due from plaintiff to defendants under the agreement between 
the parties which have not been paid as oftoday's date, and the total amount of payments, if any, due 
to the defendants in the future; 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine. 









If the jury decides the defendants are entitled to recover from the plaintiff on their 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably 
and fairly compensate the defendant for damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the 
unjust enrichment. 
The measure of damages is the total value of the actual benefit realized and retained by the 
plaintiff resulting from the transfer of business property to the plaintiff 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine. 








INSTRUCTION NO .. .:::> lP 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the 
following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's breach 
of contract: 
UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine. 
IDJI 9.03 Damages for breach of contract general format 
Given: 
Refused: 
Modified: 
Covered: 
Other: 
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